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Abstract

This Article examines the role that the incest taboo has played in shaping a normative vision of
the family in the law, and argues that the law must reappraise the extent to which disgust, rather
than reasoned argument, sustains laws governing sexual and familial choice. It takes issue with
the claim that discussion of the taboo has led to its erosion, and contends that it has remained a
powerful symbol of non-normative sexuality that is used as the extreme case against which
kinship relations are measured. In order to explain why the taboo has persisted over time as a
point of comparison to any non-normative family arrangement (interracial marriage, same-sex
marriage), it maintains that incest, more than any other taboo on the slippery slope of sexual
deviance, represents an archetypal form of disgust and boundary violation. This theory of incest
as a core symbol of disgust looks to other disciplines, including political theory, anthropology,
and psychology, that have described disgust in similar terms, namely, as a mechanism triggered
in response to any perceived instance of boundary violation. After situating the taboo within this
theoretical framework, this Article explores more fully how, and why, the law has relied on the
taboo to discriminate against consensual sexual relationships, and suggests reasons why the law
has an investment in casting the taboo as a symbol of non-normative kinship. It concludes by
suggesting ways in which the law might turn away from the taboo and embrace other models that
conceive of kinship in more expansive and less disgust-driven ways.

“Incest” is symbolic of the special way in which the pattern of social relationships, as they are
normatively defined, can be broken . . . . “Incest” means the wrong way to act in a
relationship . . . . To act not merely wrong, but to act in a manner opposite to that which is
proper. It is to “desecrate” relationships. It is to act “ungrammatically.”
David Schneider, The Meaning of Incest2
[I]t seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica3
Just a few months ago, Peter Munz, a highly respected professor emeritus of history at
the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, and former student of Karl Popper and
Ludwig Wittgenstein, suggested to lawmakers in Parliament that they repeal New Zealand’s
criminal prohibition against sexual relations between close relatives.4 The immediate response
by the Members of Parliament (MPs) was silence. As The New Zealand Herald reported the
following day, “[m]embers were so bewildered they failed to even stare at him with their mouths
open: ‘Total lack of comprehension, and then they simply said no.’”5
Professor Munz, whose research for a book on the evolution of cultures led to his interest
in the incest taboo, later remarked to the Herald that “‘I was amazed with the reaction of the
select committee . . . I don’t expectthem to agree with me but I did [sic] expect them to ask
intelligent questions.’”6 Although Munz made clear that his proposal was limited to consensual
relationships, it was too late: The mere mention of incest signaled the death knell to any further
discussion. As the Herald afterwards commented, “[t]he topic [of incest], like legalising
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homosexuality and same-sex marriages, is highly emotional and people do not really reason it
out.”7 A number of commentators in the United States made precisely this connection – between
incest and same-sex marriage – when reacting to Munz’s suggestion with remarks such as “[t]he
media laughed at Rick Santorum when he mentioned it, but look . . . it’s already starting to
happen,” and “[y]ou laugh now. But the truth is that legally after Lawrence v. Texas Pandora’s
box is now open.”8 Or, as National Review cartoonist, Roman Genn, recently quipped in light of
Munz’s suggestion, “Oh dear, we knew it would come to this – what with the whole same-sexmarriage thing – but so soon?”9
The silent dismissal of Professor Munz’s suggestion reflects a more deep-seated fear
surrounding sexual taboos in general and the incest taboo in particular. Merely to discuss the
possibility of decriminalizing incest, would be to acknowledge that the erosion of certain
sexuality morality laws in New Zealand has inevitably led – or could inevitably lead – to the
elimination of all of those laws.10 So, too, in the United States. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Senator Rick Santorum warned that “[i]f the Supreme Court says
that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have the right to
bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to
adultery. You have the right to anything.”11 While publicly condemned for his glib remark,
Santorum was simply reiterating what the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick had already said in
198612 and what one dissenting Justice in Lawrence would soon say in 2003. Adding, among
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others, bestiality, fornication, and obscenity to the mix, Justice Scalia declared in his Lawrence
dissent that “[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called
into question by today’s decision.”13 Santorum and Scalia’s remarks reflect the extent to which
incest has been a key player on the proverbial slippery slope, a favorite of jurists and political
pundits alike.
Although the topic of incest has recently percolated into public and political discussion,
leading one scholar to remark that “[i]ncest is in the public eye,”14 the incest taboo has a long
and mythic past. Indeed, incest has been an object of literary and anthropological interest since
long before 429 B.C., when Sophocles wrote the tragic play from which the incest taboo derives
its Freudian underpinnings. Despite its longevity, however, the subject of the taboo and the way
in which it has shaped the law specifically, and culture more generally, has received surprisingly
limited attention in legal scholarship. With few exceptions,15 little critical work has been
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devoted to the way in which sexual taboos – including, but not limited to, the incest taboo – work
their power to influence and shape the law, politics, and public perception.
In this Article, I limit myself to the way in which one sexual taboo – incest – has operated
in two related legal domains, namely, in the law surrounding sexuality and in family law.
Specifically, I examine the structure of the incest taboo, paying particular attention to the way in
which it has been used to define a normative vision of sexuality and the family. While incest is
not the only taboo on the slippery slope of sexual deviance, it is the one taboo that, I shall argue,
represents in the collective imagination (including the legal imagination) an archetypal or
prototypical form of boundary violation. Or, in the words of the late David Schneider, incest
symbolizes “the wrong way to act in a relationship.”16 It is for this reason that incest has been a
recurring object of comparison, by legal actors, policymakers, and others, to a range of
relationships that provoke disgust in ways that recall the mythic horror of the incest taboo.
In the Parts that follow, I shall take issue with the argument, advanced by some legal
commentators, that discussion about the taboo has led to its erosion and that “incest taboos
appear less serious than a generation ago because procreation is no longer always a primary
concern of marriage.”17 While states have surely lifted certain incest prohibitions, and while
courts have been analyzing the legitimacy of incest laws for quite some time, the incest taboo
remains a potent symbol of non-normative sexuality – indeed, it continues to represent a
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“serious” threat to the ideal family unit, one that is comprised of heterosexual parents who have
children through a “natural” mode of reproduction. In addition, despite the multiplicity of
meanings that attach to incest among the states, it has recently emerged as a single and
monolithic force – incest or the incest taboo – in debates over the constitution of the family and
its mode of reproduction. In this Article, I am more interested in examining and critiquing the
way in which the incest taboo has given rise to certain forms of kinship – and has maintained
those forms as the only natural and legitimate ones – rather than in assessing whether laws
against incest either will, or should, be repealed.18 While this Article agrees with the statement
that “the proffered explanations for incest prohibitions should be deeply problematic for any
same-sex marriage advocate,”19 among others, it does not aim to provide a systematic framework
for overturning incest laws specifically. Rather, it questions the privileged position that the
incest taboo has maintained in the law governing sexuality and the family more generally, and
argues that the law must reappraise the extent to which disgust, rather than reasoned argument,
sustains laws directed at sexual and familial choice.20
Part I will examine the structural features of the slippery slope, one of the primary means
by which taboos in general, and the incest taboo in particular, have been transmitted in an effort
to influence public opinion and to shape legal norms. After providing a theoretical analysis of
slippery slopes, I shall turn to the role that incest has played on the slope of sexual deviance and
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examine a recent case in which Lawrence and its so-called companion case, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,21 have appeared to figure in the feared movement down the
slippery slope to incest.22
Part II will draw from Part I’s analysis of slippery slopes in order to examine more
closely the key position that incest has occupied at, or near, the bottom of the slippery slope of
sexual deviance. I shall argue that incest is a bad fit for slippery slope arguments. When we say
that we are slipping down the slope to polygamy, or adultery, or bestiality, it is fairly clear what
we mean and where we are going because those taboos have a relatively definite meaning. But
when we say that we are slipping down the slope to incest, the meaning of which is much less
definite and has shifted over time, it is much less clear where we are headed. Although incest
appears in legal and non-legal slippery slope arguments as a single and monolithic taboo, incest,
in fact, is marked by definitional variety (from state to state, including who can commit, and
what constitutes, incest) and halting progress toward legalization. In other words, it is unlikely
that same-sex marriage will cause us to slide down the slope because in some ways we have
already slipped.
Parts III and IV will move from the slippery slope to a closer examination of the
justifications for the incest taboo. These Parts will reveal the extent to which the irrational
emotion of disgust, which presumably has no place in the rational enterprise called the law, is
really doing the work to sustain laws against incest and the other sexual relationships to which
incest has been compared. These Parts will provide the theoretical framework that I shall use to
explain not only why the incest taboo has remained a powerful and monolithic taboo (the incest
taboo) on the slippery slope, but also why incest has been compared to other sexual (and
21

798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
I refer to Lawrence and Goodridge as “companion cases” in the sense that critics have approached them in
similar terms with respect to their perceived roles in activating the so-called “slippery slope to incest.”

22

6

reproductive) taboos pertaining to the constitution of the family. Part III will first ask the more
general question why incest provokes such disgust. Here, I shall contend that the genetic harm
and child sexual abuse justifications for the incest taboo fail both to capture the full range of
disgust that incest represents and to explain why incest continues to remain a potent symbol of
non-normative sexuality. Part IV will then provide the critical framework that I shall use to
situate my theory of the incest taboo as a form of boundary maintenance as well as the more
general theory of disgust as boundary violation. This Part will look closely at the way in which
comparisons have been made between incest and other taboos, old and new, in order to help
bring into focus the theory of boundary violation that I put forward.
In Part V, I shall draw from the theoretical claims made in the previous Parts to explore
more fully how, and why, incest has been strategically used to articulate an ideal vision of the
family – a vision grounded in a particular understanding of nature and the natural family unit.
Here, I shall contend that the incest taboo has continued to shape a normative understanding of
the family with respect to who can get married and how they can reproduce, despite the claim
that “rational analysis” of the incest taboo has “weaken[ed] the taboo.”23 In addition, I shall
return to the logic of disgust in order to illuminate the symbiotic relationship that exists between
the law and the incest taboo.
The basic thrust of the Article is this: The incest taboo has figured – and continues to
figure – crucially in slippery slope arguments over sexuality and the constitution of the family,
and yet it is a bad fit for the slippery slope model. Further, harm justifications for the incest
taboo are suspect. The question then arises why, despite these weaknesses, the incest taboo and
its role in the slippery slope metaphor should figure so heavily in contemporary arguments about
acceptable and unacceptable familial arrangements. I shall argue that the emotion of disgust is
23
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the only way to comprehend the depth and breadth of the incest taboo and its persistent place of
‘honor’ at the bottom of the slippery slope. But can disgust, which is largely socially contingent,
carry the freight of such a powerful metaphorical symbol? In other words, can we be so
confident in our ‘tastes’ (disgust) that we permit them to dictate proscribed and prescribed forms
for the expression of the basic human need for intimacy? Or should the law reappraise the
breadth of the incest prohibition and the extent to which incest-revulsion substitutes for rational
evaluation of other so-called deviant, perverse relationships?

Part I

Incest and the Slippery Slope

In order to appreciate the persistence of the incest taboo over time, it is necessary first to
understand the role that the taboo has played in arguments pertaining to the legal regulation of
sexuality. Section A will provide a general overview of the structure and function of slippery
slopes. Section B will then look specifically at the position that incest has maintained, both
historically and currently,at the bottom of the slippery slope of sexual deviance. This Section
will also look at a recent state court case that has received a good deal of attention by slippery
slope enthusiasts. I shall contend, however, that the slippery slope arguments that have surfaced
in response to this case are unpersuasive, and, in fact, shed light on inherent weaknesses of the
“slippery slope to incest” formulation.

A.

Structural Features of the Slippery Slope

What do slippery slopes tell us about sexual taboos like incest? Or, more appropriately,
how might we define the precise relationship that exists between sexual taboo and the slippery
slope in the legal, social, and political domains? Sexual taboos and slippery slopes often go
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hand-in-hand in both legal reasoning and political debate. In fact, we might even say that one of
the primary functions of the sexual taboo is to define the parameters of the slippery slope (or at
least a certain kind of slippery slope), for the more taboo the prohibition, the steeper, and hence
more slippery, the slope. Sexual taboos and slippery slopes, or rather sexual taboos on slippery
slopes, have been key players in the culture wars over the extent to which the state may control
the intimate realms of family and sexuality – to say nothing of the highly contested issue of
whether the state has any business interfering in the latter of those two realms at all.
As a constitutive feature of the slippery slope, sexual taboos have been effective in
scripting the controversy over same-sex marriage, providing the language that we now use, in
nearly unconscious fashion, to frame this legal and political issue.24 Prior to Lawrence, sexual
taboos and slippery slopes were routinely deployed in an attempt to influence public opinion
with respect to whether consensual sexual behavior should be subject to criminal penalties. Even
after Lawrence, one suspects that legal actors and policymakers will continue to rely on sexual
taboos and slippery slopes in order to regulate a range of issues concerning the queer community,
including, among others, marriage, adoption proceedings, and custody determinations.25
The classic formulation of the slippery slope resembles the following: While A, the case
under consideration or the “instant case,” is innocuous enough, B, the danger case, must be
avoided at all costs – even if that means forfeiting A. As Frederick Schauer explains, “[a]
slippery slope argument claims that permitting the instant case – a case that it concedes to be
facially innocuous and that it linguistically distinguishes from the danger case – will nevertheless
24
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lead to, or increase the likelihood of, the danger case.”26 While Schauer insists that A, the instant
case, is innocuous and perhaps even desirable,27 other commentators, including Eugene Volokh
and Eric Lode, have qualified Schauer’s structural prototype by observing that the inoffensive
nature of A is not a necessary predicate for a slippery slope argument: “Sometimes appeals to
SSAs [slippery slope arguments] are . . . attempts to help us see what their proponents believe is
the objectionable nature of A. While SSAs may implicitly concede that A is unobjectionable
considered alone, such arguments need not make this concession.”28
Two species of slippery slope arguments exist: rational grounds and empirically-based.
Rational grounds slippery slope arguments assume that a distinction cannot be made between A,
the object under consideration, and B, the object of comparison. This kind of argument “rel[ies]
on the idea that there is no non-arbitrary stopping place anywhere along the slope. Typically,
such arguments maintain that there are no important differences between A and m, between m
and n . . . and the clearly objectionable B.”29 Take the following argument as an example:
Because marijuana and cocaine are in essence the same – each a mind-altering substance – the
law cannot, within the bounds of logic, permit the use of one drug and prohibit the other. Insofar
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as “we can draw no non-arbitrary line along the slope, rational grounds SSAs maintain that we
should not step on it in the first place.”30
By contrast, empirical slippery slope arguments assume that while differences between A
and B exist, A should nevertheless be prohibited “on the grounds that allowing it would increase
the likelihood of our allowing each successive case on the slope, until we finally reach some
objectionable result.”31 Take now the slightly modified version of the first drug argument: While
marijuana and cocaine might reflect different orders of magnitude on the mind-altering substance
scale, the legalization of marijuana might lead to the legalization of cocaine; for this reason, the
law should allow neither. Whereas rational grounds SSAs thus posit that there is no principled
distinction between A and B – e.g., marijuana and cocaine, or, more relevant here, same-sex
marriage and incest – empirical SSAs are slightly more discriminating, recognizing the
difference between A and B but nonetheless wary that one could easily slip from A to B by
making a series of concessions along the way down the slope.
Whether we characterize slippery slopes as rational-grounds or empirically-based,
however, the fear is largely the same, namely, that A will either collapse, or slip into, B, which
sits near, or at, the bottom of the slope and threatens to pull A down through sheer gravitational
force. While rational-grounds slippery slope arguments might posit that no principled distinction
exists between A and B, they nevertheless still employ the metaphor of the slope – one that
reflects a moral hierarchy whereby B, or whatever rests at the bottom, is worse than A. It is for
this reason – the avoidance of B, at all costs – that the slippery slope argument is deployed in
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order to maintain the status quo, or what Schauer calls the “state of rest.”32 Put less abstractly,
for some individuals, same-sex marriage (A) and incest (B) might very well be equally
contemptible and share common characteristics. Nevertheless, there is still no getting around the
fact that incest, our “B” here, remains at the bottom of the slope and thus in some sense enjoys
the privilege of being the worst of a bad lot.33
While the claim that A will cause or result in B might in some ways be “illogical,”34 and
while slippery slope arguments are not always “logically compelled,”35 they are nevertheless
highly persuasive because they appear to “describe a behavioral reality” – that is, they seem to
reflect the way people think. Moreover, slippery slopes can be potent rhetorical tools, and,
according to Volokh, “present a real risk – not always, but often enough that we cannot lightly
ignore the possibility of such slippage.”36 As Volokh has recently demonstrated, the
“mechanisms” of slippage are wide-ranging, and include the driving role of precedent in
American law, the vagaries of the democratic process, linguistic imprecision, and the degree to
which the consideration (and eventual legalization) of A might cause an attitudinal shift –
leading legislators, jurists, and the public alike to find B less threatening and perhaps
inevitable.37 To this list one might add the gravitational force of the landmark case, that is,
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“cases we use to chart our course to future decisions” and that “alter[ ] our jurisprudence by
introducing some new value into it or by altering the significance we attach to some value
already existent in our discourse.”38 Proponents of the slippery slope might argue that “[i]f a
decision allowing A is likely to be viewed as a landmark, we may have good grounds for fearing
that the judiciary will gradually allow practices further down the slope.”39 Some slippery slope
enthusiasts have already conceptualized Lawrence and Goodridge in precisely this way, that is,
as two such landmark cases that could lead us down the slope toward several different Bs,
including same-sex marriage and the decriminalization of all sexual morality laws, such as laws
prohibiting incest.40

B.

Incest and Slippery Slope Arguments

Both prior to and following Lawrence and Goodridge, two species of incest slippery
slope arguments were current: First, the movement from sodomy to “incestuous” sex (the
decriminalization of incest); and second, the movement from same-sex marriage to incestuous
marriage (the civil recognition of incestuous relationships).41 To be sure, these same‘parade of

would have rejected before”); see also Lode, supra note _____, at 1515 (“Other closely related factors can also lead
to such slides. First, going through some process may change our views of that process. By allowing each
successive case on a slope, judges’ views on the law may begin to change in ways that lead them to neglect their
possible hesitancy to step on the slope in the first place. Second, allowing some practice could lead to a shift in our
norms regarding when uses of that practice are appropriate. Third, certain decisions may become landmarks – cases
we use to chart our course to future decisions”).
38
Lode, supra note _____, at 1519.
39
Id.
40
See Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004) (stating that “the best we can do now is take the measure of Lawrence as a landmark in
its own right by placing its logic in the context of the larger project of elaborating, organizing, and bringing to
maturity the Constitution’s elusive but unquestionably central protections of liberty, equality, and – underlying both
– respect for human dignity”).
41
It should be noted that the division that I have made between criminal incest (sexual relations) and the civil
prohibition against incestuous marriage is not entirely apt in light of the fact that in several states, criminal incest is
defined as either marriage or sexual relations. Such is not the case with respect to the criminal/civil distinction
between sodomy and same-sex marriage, which are clearly different. If anything, the fact that in some states
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horribles’ arguments pre-dated Lawrence, and were, in fact, fairly commonplace in the mid1990s. For instance, testifying before Congress prior to the passage of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA),42 Hadley Arkes, Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst
College, posed the following question: If same-sex marriage were allowed, “[w]hat is the ground
on which the law would turn back challenges” to incest? 43
It is important to note, however, that slippery slope arguments that raise the specter of
incest are neither new nor particular to the debate over the legalization of sodomy and same-sex
marriage. Rather, incest has occupied a privileged position on the slippery slope of sexual
deviance for quite some time now, as the taboo against incest was once used to support the taboo
against miscegenation in arguments that bear a striking resemblance to the arguments that have
more recently surfaced. Incest therefore has a history of appearing on the slippery slope at times
when law and culture are confronted with threatening forms of sexuality and non-normative
family arrangements.
For instance, in 1872, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether the state could
prosecute an interracial couple for violating Tennessee’s anti- miscegenation law. In that case,
State v. Bell,44 the plaintiffs, a white man and an African-American woman, were married in
Mississippi, which, unlike Tennessee at that time, permitted interracial marriage. Although
recognizing that such unions were permitted in the state of Mississippi, the Bell court
nevertheless upheld the couple’s conviction for miscegenation in the state of Tennessee by
adverting to three related forms of boundary control: State sovereignty, anti-miscegenation laws,
and the incest taboo.
incestuous sex is no different from incestuous marriage insofar as either would constitute the crime of incest,
highlights the ambiguity of the very term “incest” as it has been deployed in legal and political debate.
42
28 U.S.C. 115, sec. 1738 (1996).
43
150 CONG. REC. (May 15, 1996) (testimony of Hadley Arkes).
44
66 Tenn. 9 (1872).

14

The court first noted that because “[e]ach State is a sovereign, a government within, of,
and for itself . . . [it] cannot be subjected to the recognition of a fact or act contravening its public
policy . . . as lawful, because it was made . . . in a State having no prohibition against it or even
permitting it.”45 The court’s use of the public policy rationale implicitly rested on the trope of
boundary maintenance; indeed, the phrase “within, of, and for itself” represented the linguistic
correlative of the geographical, social, and political boundaries that separated the states and
ensured their individual sovereignty.46 Racial miscegenation here found its counterpart in
geographical miscegenation couched in the language of conflict of laws – each an equally
dangerous and infective form of boundary violation. Put slightly differently, the physical body
(the actual “mixing” of the races) figured as a metaphor for the body politic (protection of state
borders), and vice versa.47
In addition, the Bell court deployed the now proverbial slippery slope argument involving
the ineluctable descent to incest: “This would leave the state open to the danger of the father
living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock,
because they had formed such relations in a State or country where they were not prohibited.”48
In addition to considering the threat of racial mixing and to framing the issue as one of state
sovereignty, the court thus presaged yet a third form of boundary violation, namely, intra-

45

Id.
The Bell court was not alone in situating the issue of interracial marriage within the larger context of state
sovereignty. For instance, in 1878, the Supreme Court of Virginia remarked that laws against interracial marriage
would be “futile and a dead letter if in fraud of these salutary enactments, both races might, by stepping across an
imaginary line, bid defiance to the law, by immediately returning and insisting that the marriage celebrated in
another state or country, should be recognized as lawful, though denounced by the public law of the domicile as
unlawful and absolutely void.” Kinney v. Com., 71 Va. 858, 859 (1878). Similarly, in 1890, the Supreme Court of
Georgia underscored the need to maintain boundaries “between” borders and “between” the races: “It will thus be
seen how clearly recognized and distinctly fixed is the purpose of the state of Georgia to prohibit within its borders,
miscegenation, as the result of marriages between the white and black races.” State of Ga. v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 757
(C.C. Ga. 1890).
47
In this sense, one might recall the passage of DOMA and its “mini” state equivalents as similar efforts to
delineate boundaries and assert state sovereignty over the definition of marriage.
48
State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
46
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familial sexuality. While I shall return to this idea of incest as an exemplary form of boundary
violation in Part IV – one that helps to bring into focus the routine comparison between incest
and miscegenation – suffice it to note here that incest once occupied a position at the bottom of
the slippery slope with respect to miscegenation that resembles the position that it currently
occupies with respect to same-sex relations.
Similarly, slightly more than ten years after Bell, the Supreme Court of Missouri
considered whether to sustain a demurrer to an indictment charging a white woman with
violating a statute that made interracial marriage a felony. The plaintiff in that case, State v.
Jackson,49 contended that Missouri’s anti-miscegenation statute violated the state and federal
constitutions. In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim and reversing the lower court’s judgment
sustaining the demurrer, the court compared laws against miscegenation to laws against incest,
stating that “the State has the same right to regulate marriage in this respect that it has to forbid
the intermarriage of cousins and other blood relations.”50 As with the Bell court, the Jackson
court deployed a variant of the slippery slope argument in portending the deplorable
consequences that would follow should the court find that the federal Constitution guaranteed an
unqualified right to marry:
All of one’s rights as a citizen of the United States will be found guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States. If any provision of that instrument confers
upon a citizen the right to marry any one who is willing to wed him, our attention
has not been called to it. If such be one of the rights attached to American
citizenship all our marriage acts forbidding intermarriage between persons within
certain degrees of consanguinity are void, and the nephew may marry his aunt, the
niece her uncle, and the son his mother or grandmother. . . . The condition of a
community, moral, mental and physical, which would tolerate indiscriminate
intermarriage for several generations, would demonstrate the wisdom of laws

49
50

State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 176 (Mo. 1883).
Id.
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which regulate marriage and forbid the intermarriage of those nearly related in
blood.51
As in Bell, incest functioned in Jackson as the danger case toward which society might slip
should the relationship in question – interracial marriage – receive legal recognition. In both
cases from the post-war period, the courts relied on a kind of rhetorical proliferation – “the
nephew may marry his aunt, the niece her uncle, and the son his mother or grandmother” – as a
means of conveying the negative concatenating effect of decriminalizing tabooed sexual
behavior.
The rhetorical proliferation of the ‘parade of horribles’ that would result should states
recognize interracial marriage resonates with the recent declarations with respect to same-sex
relations. Like the Bell court, critics of sodomy and same-sex marriage have relied on a similar
strategy of rhetorical proliferation: “[i]f the Supreme Court says that you have the right to
consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to
polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to
anything.”52 In addition to the more formal pronouncements of Justice Scalia and Senator
Santorum, a number of commentators have taken up the perceived relationship between incest
and same-sex relations in light of Lawrence and Goodridge. For instance, one commentator has
noted that “Santorum has a point in asserting that such a ruling could put us on a slippery slope
toward legalizing some forms of incest, the most repellent of the practices he listed.”53

51

Id.
Senator Rick Santorum, Associated Press Interview (Apr. 7, 2003).
53
Stuart Taylor Jr., Santorum on Sex: Where the Slippery Slope Leads, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (May 6, 2003)
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2003-05-06.htm (“Santorum’s remarks are more plausible as legal
analysis than most critics have acknowledged. Might Lord Byron’s problem nonetheless be outlawed because it has
long been despised as repugnant and immoral? Not if there is an unqualified constitutional right to consensual adult
sex. And sodomy, no less than sibling incest, has for centuries been subject to ‘condemnation . . . firmly rooted in
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards,’ as the late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stressed in a concurrence in
Bowers v. Hardwick. Public opinion is moving toward majority support for a right to have gay sex. But it’s not
there yet”); but see Austin Bramwell, Mutilated Debate: Homosexuality Shouldn’t Be Compared to Incest, NAT’L
52
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More recently, Stanley Kurtz, a research fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Center and critic for
The National Review, has argued that same-sex marriage will lead not only to the dissolution of
marriage as an institution, but also to incest. Kurtz contends that the “[t]he taboo against
homosexuality works in a similar fashion” as the taboo against incest; consequently, the erosion
of one taboo might lead to the erosion of another, such that “[g]ay marriage would set in motion
a series of threats . . . from which the institution of marriage may never recover.”54 Because the
mythic specter of incest exists near the bottom, and helps to define the gradient, of the slippery
slope, any slippage that might occur through the legalization of same-sex marriage must be
prevented before it begins.55
The correlation between incest and same-sex relations is by no means a mere rhetorical
flourish, although a perennial favorite of conservative commentators. Rather, some less biased
commentators maintain that the slippery slope arguments that have been made with respect to
incest and same-sex relations might not be entirely far-fetched. For instance, Slatemagazine’s

REV. ONLINE (March 8, 2004) http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bramwell200403040848.htm (stating that
“the incest gambit, while tactically shrewd, is strategically unsound. For one thing, it reinforces the impression that
conservatives only object to new rights for gays out of disgust for their conduct. Mere feelings, however, no matter
how strong, do not provide reasons for government policies. Besides, if disgust for homosexual acts can be
overcome (as, among today’s youth, it already has), so, presumably, can disgust for incestuous acts”); Dahlia
Lithwick, Slippery Slop: The Maddening Slippery Slope Argument Against Gay Marriage, SLATE (May 19, 2004)
http://slate.msn.com/id/2100824 (stating that “[s]ince few opponents of homosexual unions are brave enough to
admit that gay weddings just freak them out, they hide behind the claim that it’s an inexorable slide from legalizing
gay marriage to having sex with penguins outside JC Penney’s. The problem is it’s virtually impossible to debate
against a slippery slope. Before you know it you fall down, break your crown, and Rick Santorum comes tumbling
after”).
54
Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 30,
2003) http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz043003.asp.
55
See generally James Dobson, Marriage Under Fire, FAMILY.ORG (Aug. 1, 2004) http://www.family.org; Louis
Sheldon, Utah Man Uses Sodomy Decision to Push for Polygamy, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION (May 1, 2004)
http://www.traditionalvalues.org/modules (stating that the “flawed logic” of Lawrence “could easily be extended to
‘consensual’ incest, prostitution, bestiality, and group sex orgies in the ‘privacy’ of a person’s home”); Michelle
McCaffe, Catholic Bishops Say Same-sex Marriage Will Open the Door to Incest (quoting Jean-Claude Cardinal
Turncotte, Archbishop of Montreal, who in the wake of Lawrence stated that “[w]hen you change the definition of
the institution, you open the door to things you can’t foresee. If marriage is a union between two persons who love
each other – that’s the new definition, without the allusion to sex – where does the notion stop? Will you recognize
the marriage between a father and his daughter? Between a brother and his sister? Or two brothers or two sisters? . . .
It’s very dangerous because we don’t know the consequences”).
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chief political correspondent, William Saletan, has suggested that Santorum’s claim that “being
gay [is] on the same legal and moral plane as a person who commits incest” is not so wildly
implausible:
In its brief to the Supreme Court in the sodomy case, the [Human Rights
Campaign] maintains that “criminalizing the conduct that defines the class serves
no legitimate state purpose,” since gays “are not less productive – or more
dangerous – members of the community by mere dint of their sexual orientation.”
They sustain “committed relationships” and “serve their country in the military
and in the government.” Fair enough. But couldn’t the same be said of sibling
couples? Don’t laugh. Cousin couples are already making this argument.56
While Saletan “[t]hink[s] Santorum is wrong” because a moral difference exists between incest
and same-sex relations, he concludes by ceding that “legally, I don’t see why a sexual right to
privacy, if it exists, shouldn’t cover consensual incest.”57 In the same vein, Volokh has
suggested that, contrary to the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s assertion otherwise, it is
“eminently plausible” that “the Massachusetts homosexual marriage decision may lead to
legalization of adult incestuous marriages.” 58
Some individuals would agree with Professor Volokh. For instance, four months after
deciding Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Rahim,59 a
case that has enjoyed considerable notoriety among slippery slope critics. In that case, the court
56

William Saletan, Incest Repellant? If Gay Sex is Private, Why Isn’t Incest?, SLATE (Apr. 23, 2003)
http://slate.msn.com/id/2082075; see also Saletan, Incest Repellant Continued? More on Santorum, Sodomy, and
Incest, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2003) http://slate.msn.com/id/2082075.
57
Id. (Apr. 23, 2003).
58
Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 18, 2003) http://volokh.com/2003_11_16_volokh_archive.html.
Volokh remarks that

59

[t]he [Goodridge] court reasons that “the right to marry means little if it does not include the right
to marry the person of one’s choice,” but while it qualifies this as “subject to appropriate
government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare,” it’s far from clear
that a court would find that “health, safety, and welfare” would be hurt by adult polygamous
marriages (assuming all existing partners in the marriage consent to the addition of another).
Likewise for adult brother-sister marriages; as I mentioned several months ago, I think the genetic
harm argument doesn’t really work here – after all, we don’t generally ban marriages between
people who have serious genetic diseases, even if the odds of a defect in their children are much
higher than for brother-sister marriages.
805 N.E.2d 13 (2004).
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considered whether a Massachusetts incest statute applied to purely affinal60 relationships. The
defendant was charged with rape, abuse of a minor, and incest in connection with the sexual
abuse of his sixteen year-old stepdaughter.61 Because the defendant was not related to his
stepdaughter by either blood or adoption, he moved to dismiss the incest charge, arguing that
“the necessary element of consanguinity under the incest statute was absent.”62 The Rahim court
agreed with the defendant on the ground that the plain language of the statute did not include
affinal relationships within its definition of incest, and that there was no evidence to suggest that
the legislature intended to include such relationships.
Following a lengthy interpretation of the statute and of the etymology of
“consanguineous,” the court held that the incest statute applied only to blood relations.63 While
recognizing the abusive character of the relationship in question, the court nevertheless
expressed concern that criminalizing affinity-based relationships would unduly infringe on
consensual adult sexual conduct: “The interpretation that the Commonwealth urges on us sweeps
up and criminalizes not only the repugnant conduct alleged in this case, but a wide assortment of
relationships between consenting adults.”64 In addition, the court emphasized the fact that the
state had already successfully charged the defendant under a number of other criminal statutes –
in other words, regardless of how the court ruled on the incest charge, the defendant still would
have faced additionalcriminal penalties .65 The court finally concluded by remarking that “[w]e
leave it to the Legislature to expand the incest prohibition if it so chooses.”66

60

By “purely affinal” I mean, here and throughout, a relationship based exclusively on marriage (e.g., steprelatives related by neither the whole nor the half blood).
61
805 N.E.2d at 13.
62
Id. at 14.
63
Id. at 23.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 23.
66
Com. v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 287, 805 N.E.2d 13, 23 (Mass. 2004).
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One might speculate, as many have, that the Rahim decision and its focus on consent
were motivated, in part, by the same court’s decision in Goodridge four months earlier and by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence. Language such as laws that “sweep up” a “wide
assortment of relationships between consenting adults” could be lifted directly out of Lawrence,
whose focus was on private, consensual sexual activity between adults. Not surprisingly, this is
precisely what slippery slope enthusiasts proclaimed in the wake of Rahim. For instance, after
Rahim was decided, a student writing on Harvard Law School’s Federalist Society’s weblog, Ex
Parte, opined that “[e]very week, it becomes clearer – Lawrence and Goodridge do undermine
the criminalization of incest.”67 Similarly, in an article that was circulated widely over the
Internet, entitled “Massachusetts Burning: Gay Marriage Leads to Incest,” the writer declared
that
making no sense and running roughshod over the voters and families of
Massachusetts is what this same 4-3 majority has begun to get really good at. I
said earlier this year – when this same majority ordered by executive fiat that the
acceptance of sexual unions of the same-sex (homosexual) “marriage” be
mandated and recognized by law – that rulings like this [Rahim] were on their
way. I just never believed that they would come so quickly.68
The problem with this statement – as with so much information on the woefully unedited
Internet – is that it got the facts wrong: With the exception of one Justice, the 4-3 majority in
Rahim was not the same 4- 3 majority in Goodridge. In fact, the Justice who authored a
dissenting opinion in Goodridge, Justice Cordy, was the same Justice who authored the majority
opinion in Rahim, thus casting doubt on the slippery slope contention that the majority in Rahim
was somehow compelled to recognize “consensual adult relations” between stepfathers and

67

http://fedsoc.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_fedsoc_archive.html (Mar. 23, 2004).
Kevin McCullough, Massachusetts Burning: Gay Marriage Leads to Incest, WORLDNETDAILY (Mar. 23, 2004)
http://www.worldnetdaily.com.
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stepdaughters because that same majority had extended the civil right of marriage to same-sex
couples in Goodridge.
More important, though, is the fact that the Rahim court was simply following an
approach that it had followed in prior cases when dealing with similar matters of statutory
interpretation. For instance, in an earlier case, Commonwealth v. Smith,69 the same court
considered whether digital penetration and oral sex fell within the scope of the state incest
statute, which defined the act of incest as marriage and/or sexual intercourse. There, the court
held that “in light of . . . legislative activity, we are compelled to limit the meaning of ‘sexual
intercourse’ in G.L. c. 272, § 17, to penile-vaginal penetration, with or without emission, and to
conclude that the incest indictments against the defendant were properly dismissed.”70 As a
result of the court’s holding in Smith, the Massachusetts legislature amended the incest statute
two years later to include “unnatural sexual intercourse” in the list of prohibited activities. In
light of Smith, it would appear that, rather than sliding down a slippery slope that Goodridge and
Lawrence put into motion, theRahim court simply felt that its hands were tied – as it surely felt,
and openly conveyed, in Smith – because the legislature had chosen to define incest in a rather
narrow way.
I submit that whether Rahim in fact reflects a movement down the slippery slope is
largely speculative, and, as I have contended, highly unlikely. However, I would also submit
that Rahim is useful because it suggests at least two reasons why the privileged position that the
incest taboo has enjoyed on the slippery slope deserves closer attention.
First, Rahim reveals the extent to which a uniform definition of incest does not exist. The
legal heuristic of the slippery slope as something on which we slip from A to B assumes that

69
70

Com. v. Smith, 431 Mass. 417, 728 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 419-20, 728 N.E.2d at 275 -76.
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there is something definite (or definable) into which we might slip. However, Rahim shows that
what might be incestuous behavior in one state – e.g., sexual relations between a stepfather and
stepdaughter – might be permissible, non-incestuous behavior in another.
Second, Rahim, which relies on a wealth of prior case law dealing with the legitimacy
and interpretation of state incest statutes, reveals the extent to which the legal conversation about
incest has been occurring for quite some time before Goodridge and Lawrence. That is, the
slippery slope argument assumes that B (incest) is necessarily posterior to A (same-sex marriage)
and that B needs A in order to occur – or, less drastic, thatA is a vehicle through which B might
appear as an object of consideration on the public’s ‘radar screen.’ To be sure, the metaphor of
the slope is rhetorically effective precisely because it evokes a visual hierarchy between and
among terms on it (B is made possible only through A) and because it conveys a sense of
imminent slippage to a place at the bottom – a nadir – that we have never deigned to imagine.
However, Rahim shows that ‘talk’ about incest has a long history and did not suddenly
materialize after the recent decisions dealing with same-sex relations.
The following Part will look more closely at these problems that plague the slippery slope
to incest formulation in order to set the stage for exploring more fully why the incest taboo has
retained its power over time. In Parts III and IV, I shall argue that incest has maintained this
position on the slippery slope not because the “slippery slope to incest” argument is logically
persuasive, but rather because of the enormous power of incest to elicit disgust.
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Part II

A.

Problems With the “Slippery Slope to Incest” Formulation

No Single Definition of Incest Exists

Statutory definitions vary significantly among the states over what constitutes incest. It
is, of course, a basic principle of federalism that the regulation of certain social relations –
including what constitutes incest and who may (and may not) marry – lies within the province of
state control; for this reason, definitional variety is not in and of itself remarkable. However, the
variation in the legal definition of incest among the states reveals a lack of clarity over where it is
that we are slipping to when we “slip” down the proverbial slope to incest. In this sense, incest,
unlikebestiality or , say, anthropophagy, is neither a stable nor a fixed taboo in slippery slope
rhetoric.
For instance, whereas several states criminalize sexual behavior between parents and
children related by affinity, Massachusetts, Rahim tells us, does not. In fact, the criminal codes
of twenty other states, following the Model Penal Code,71 do not define as “incest” sexual
relations between family members related by affinity; some of those same states, however, do
prohibit marriage between affinally- related adults.72 Dissenting in Rahim, Justice Greaney
highlighted this paradox when he observed that “the court leaves us with a situation where this
defendant will avoid prosecution for incest, and (unless the statute is changed) a stepfather can
have consensual sexual intercourse with his sixteen year old stepdaughter without fear of
criminal sanction. (But, he will not be able to marry her).”73 Other states punish affinal incest
71

For this discussion, see Com. v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 290, 805 N.E.2d 13, 26 (Mass. 2004). The Model Penal
Code has rejected affinity-based incest. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 230.2, comment 2(c)-(e), at
405-07 (1980).
72
For instance, while in Massachusetts there is no criminal prohibition for sexual relations between individuals
related by affinity, those same individuals are prohibited from getting married under the state’s domestic relations
statute. See M.G.L.A. c. 272, § 17.
73
Rahim, 441 Mass. at 290, 805 N.E.2d at 26.
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only if the victim is a child (variously defined) or if the sexual contact was nonconsensual. For
example, Montana’s incest law provides that “[c]onsent is a defense . . . to incest with or upon a
stepson or stepdaughter, but consent is ineffective if the victim is less than 18 years old.”74
The states also vary in their application of incest statutes to first-cousins, adopted
children, in-laws, and even uncles and nieces. For instance, eighteen states and the District of
Columbia permit first-cousin marriages, whereas twenty-five do not. The remaining seven states
permit such marriages only if certain criteria are met. In Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and
Wisconsin, first-cousin marriage is permitted on the condition that the couple will not bear
children either because the woman is post-menopausal or because the couple is infertile.75 In
Maine, first-cousin marriage is permitted on the condition that the couple receives genetic
counseling prior to marriage.76 And in North Carolina, first-cousin marriage is permitted on the
condition that the marriage is not between double first cousins (i.e., those that share all lineal and
collateral relatives).77 With respect to criminal prohibitions, only eight states continue to
criminalize sexual relations between first cousins. As Brett McDonnell has observed, “[a]t the
time the Model Penal Code was drafted, eighteen states prohibited sex between first cousins,
while we have seen that that number has now dropped to eight. Thus, incest between first
cousins today is forbidden by fewer states than forbade sodomy before Lawrence.”78
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Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-507 (2003).
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3608 (West 2001); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-11(2) (West 2003); Ind. Code Ann. §
35-46-1-3 (Lexis 1998); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 765.03 (West 2001); Utah Code. Ann § 30-1-1 (West 2001).
76
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann tit. 65 § 3 (West 2001).
77
N.C. Code Ann. tit. 51 § 3 (West 2001). A rarity, double first cousins are the children of two brothers who
reproduce with two sisters. Suppose A and B, brothers from one family, marry C and D, sisters from a separate
family. A and C have children, and B and D have children. Those children are double first cousins because they
share both sets of grandparents (i.e., the children of A and C have the same grandparents as do the children of B and
D).
78
McDonnell, supra note _____, at 350; see also MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES: THE AMERICAN
MYTH OF COUSIN MARRIAGE (1996) (noting the definitional variety in first cousin incest prohibitions in the United
States and arguing that the U.S. prohibition against such unions originated largely because of the belief that it would
promote more rapid assimilation of immigrants).
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Moreover, whereas twenty states include adoptive relatives (adoptive parent and adopted
child; adopted child and adoptive siblings) within their criminal incest prohibitions, thirty states
and the District of Columbia do not. In addition, whereas forty-four states and the District of
Columbia criminalize incest between uncles or aunts and nephews or nieces, six do not. That
said, with the exception of Rhode Island, no state permits uncles/aunts and nephews/nieces to
marry. Rhode Island, which repealed its criminal incest law in 1989, has retained a civil incest
law that exempts any individuals who are related either by blood or through marriage from the
marriage prohibition, provided that they are Jewish and are governed by religious precept.79
Finally, some states, like Rhode Island, do not even criminally define sexual relations
between close blood-related individuals as incestuous. For instance, South Dakota’s criminal
code defines incest as “[a]ny person, fourteen years of age or older, who knowingly engages in
sexual contact with another person, other than that person’s spouse, if the other person is under
the age of twenty-one and is within the degree of consanguinity or affinity within which
marriages are by the laws of this state declared void.”80 Similarly, Michigan and New Jersey’s
laws prohibit incest involving persons under eighteen, but not if both are above that age.81 The
irony here, however, is that South Dakota also has a civil prohibition against marriage between
any individuals within certain degrees of blood relatedness, regardless of age.82 In other words,
while certain blood relatives cannot get married in South Dakota, they may engage in sexual
relations – as long as they are over the age of twenty-one. Indeed, these are just a few examples
of the vast diversity of the law surrounding this taboo that is routinely grouped under the
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collective, umbrella term “incest.”
In addition to a lack of uniformity over the class of individuals to which state incest
statutes apply, a lack of consensus also characterizes the precise behavior that constitutes incest.
For instance, whereas some criminal statutesdefine the prohibited activity more broadly as
“sexual contact” or “sexual conduct,” others have rather narrow definitions of the crime by
limiting it to sexual (penile-vaginal) intercourse and/or marriage (Wisconsin, Utah).83 Still
others grade the crime of incest into degrees based on the kind of behavior in question, with
sexual intercourse constituting first degree incest and sexual conduct constituting second degree
incest (Washington).84
Whereas the other taboos that occupy a place on the slippery slope are subject to a more
standardized definition among the states, the law of incest does not enjoy such uniformity. To be
sure, one might point out that a standard definition of incest does exist insofar as all states
criminalize sexual relations between, say, father and daughter or brother and sister related by the
whole or half blood. However, as discussed above, even this definition does not obtain in some
states, like South Dakota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, which do not define sexual relations
between any blood-related individuals of a certain age as incestuous. The definitional variety of
incest renders the argument that we might slip down the slope to incest – whether it be
incestuous sex or incestuous marriage – less persuasive.
If, for instance, the “slippery slope to incest” argument has been used to presage the
sexualization of the family that will follow from cases like Lawrence and Goodridge, that
argument becomes less persuasive in light of the fact that many states do not characterize sexual
relations between stepparents and stepchildren, adoptive parents and their adopted children, and

83
84

Wisc. Code 944.06 (West 2001); Utah Code. Ann § 76-7-102 (West 2001).
Wash RCW 9A.64.020 (West 2001).

27

even some blood-related parents and their children as “incest.” In other words, some states had
already determined that it was acceptable for sexual relations to occur between certain family
members before these two landmark cases were decided. In addition, if, as many believe,
legalized incest would be tantamount to legalizing intra-familial sexual abuse, then the narrow
criminal definition of incest that currently obtains in many states (e.g., penile-vaginal sexual
intercourse) suggests that such abuse is already legal – or at least not treated by the law as
incestuous per se. Finally, if slippery slope believers have adverted to incest in order to warn
others of the Darwinian nightmare that would result should incest bans be lifted, their argument
becomes less convincing in light of the fact that many states do not prohibit either sexual
relations or marriage between first cousins – where a genetic risk, while not great, is nonetheless
present – as well as that in some states (South Dakota, Rhode Island) close relatives may
reproduce without facing criminal penalties.85 I shall return to the weaknesses of the genetic (or
biological) argument in greater detail in Part III. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that
the genetic argument alone fails to capture the particular threat that incest represents.

B.

The Metaphor of the “Slope” Does Not Hold Up

Slippery slope arguments presume that the boundary separating the “extant state of
affairs” or “the state of rest” from the “danger case” (i.e., the boundary separating the flat ground
at the top of the slope from the danger that lurks at the bottom) is “firmer than the one between
the instant case and the danger case” (i.e., the boundary separating that which has moved, or
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might move, us off the flat ground and closer to the dangerous nadir).86 For this reason, anything
that brings us closer to the danger case, including theinstant case , is verboten. Applying this
formulation to the same-sex marriage-to-incest slippery slope, the likelihood of legalizing incest
based on the existing state of affairs – where we are now – is much less than the likelihood of
legalizing incest should bans against same-sex marriage be lifted.
Incest laws, however, have been subject to constitutional attack well before Lawrence
and Goodridge. Indeed, even just a brief survey of the state reporters reveals that legal
arguments and constitutional claims pertaining to the danger case at the bottom of the slope –
incest – have a lineage that predates the recent cases dealing with same-sex relations.87 In other
words, the boundary separating the “extant state of affairs” from the danger case is much less
definite than the slippery slope enthusiasts would have us believe. Whereas no court in the
United States has recognized a legal challenge to laws prohibiting polygamy or bestiality, at least

86

Schauer, supra note _____, at 378.
For instance, in State v. Benson, the defendant, a father charged with incest and sexual abuse of his biological
child, claimed that the incest statute violated his “fundamental right to private consensual acts of sexual intercourse,
regardless of the degree of affinity between the parties.” The court disagreed. Finding that the right to engage in an
incestuous relationship was not “deeply-rooted” in the Nation’s history, the court subjected the incest statute to
rational basis review, concluding that “[w]e need hardly cite authority for the obvious conclusion that this statute
bears a real and substantial relation to the public morals.” State v. Benson, 81 Ohio App. 3d 697, 700, 612 N.E.2d
337, 339 (Ohio App. 1992). Similarly, in In re: Tiffany Nicole M. v. Allen M., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
considered the constitutionality of a parental termination statute against both a due process and an equal protection
challenge. Interest of Tiffany Nicole M., 214 Wisc. 2d 302, 318-19, 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wisc. App. 1997). The
defendants in that case, biological siblings involved in a seemingly consensual relationship, had parented three
children; the state was attempting to terminate their parental rights as to one of the children on the ground that their
incestuous relationship rendered them per se unfit. Recognizing that “a parental rights proceeding interferes with a
fundamental right,” the court nevertheless found that the state had “compelling interests in the welfare of children,
preservation of family, and maintenance of an ordered society.” The court further reasoned that “[g]enetic mutation
. . . is but one consequence of incest, and only one of many reasons why Wisconsin and other states have long
prohibited incestuous marriage and criminalized incest.” Although the court cited authority for the proposition that
“[w]hether consanguineous mating causes genetic defects may be more questionable than generally assumed,” it
nevertheless did not find the biological argument to be dispositive. Id. at 320, 571 N.W.2d at 878. For other
unsuccessful constitutional challenges to state incest statutes, see Benton v. State, 265 Ga. 648, 461 S.E.2d 202
(1995) (holding that the prohibition against incest was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting
children and the family unit); In the Interest of L., 888 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a father’s
undisputed acts of incest with his minor sisters involved children “in the family” within the meaning of statutory
ground for termination of father’s parental rights to his biological daughter); State v. Buck, 92 Or. App. 130, 757
P.2d 861 (1988) (holding that incest statute does not violate federal constitutional right to privacy); State v. Kaiser,
34 Wash. App. 559, 663 P.2d 839 (1983) (holding that statute criminalizing incest does not violate equal protection).
87

29

one court has already recognized an equal protection challenge – on state constitutional grounds
– to a state incest statute.
The plaintiffs in that case, Israel v. Allen,88 challenged a provision of a Colorado incest
statute that prohibited marriage between a brother and a sister related solely by adoption on the
ground that it violated their fundamental right to marry. Although the district court agreed with
the plaintiffs that the statute was not supported by a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court
of Colorado determined that, regardless of whether marriage was a fundamental right,89 the
statute failed to satisfy even rational basis review. The Colorado court relied heavily on the
biological argument, reasoning that it was illogical to prohibit an adopted brother and sister from
marrying because there was no genetic threat:
[O]bjections that exist against consanguineous marriages are not present where
the relationship is merely by affinity. The physical detriment to the offspring of
persons related by blood is totally absent. The natural repugnance of people
toward marriages of blood relatives, that has resulted in well-nigh universal moral
condemnation of such marriages, is generally lacking in applications to the union
of those only related by affinity.90
I shall return to the Israel court’s striking analysis of the relationship between nature and
adoption through its deployment of the nature trope in Part IV. More important for the present
purposes, however, is the fact that, as far back as 1978, a court found that there was no rational
basison which to support the incest prohibition as applied to individuals r elated by adoption,
presumably ‘opening the door’ to any number of subsequent legal challenges.
The metaphor of the slippery slope derives much of its power by what it visually depicts
and by what that depiction assumes, namely, the existence of something at the bottom to which
we should give heed and the fact that we are not there yet. In the case of incest, however, neither
88

Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978).
The court maintained that whether marriage was a fundamental right in the state of Colorado was in dispute. See
Israel, 195 Colo. at 265, 577 P.2d at 764.
90
Id. at 265, 577 P.2d at 764.
89

30

of these assumptions is entirely accurate. Because the meaning of incest varies from state to
state, it is uncertain just what is lurking at the bottom of the slope – if father-daughter incest, then
that is already permitted in many states, provided that the father and daughter are not related by
blood (and, in a few states, certain forms of incest are permitted even despite the existence of a
blood relationship). Further, the fact that incest statutes have been challenged, sometimes
successfully, on constitutional grounds, suggests that A (e.g., same-sex marriage) is not
necessarily higher on the incline than B (e.g., incest) – thus casting doubt on the topography of
the slippery slope itself.
Despite the multiplicity of meanings surrounding incest and the fact that the “state of
rest” – or the flat ground before case A – is not as staid as the slippery slope model presumes, the
incest taboo remains a potent monolithic force at the bottom of the slope. In one sense, Carl
Schneider’s observation that “[r]ational analysis of taboos is not only likely to miss the point, but
even itself to weaken the taboo,”91 represents a plausible theory of the way in which prohibition
relies on silence to sustain itself. But in another sense, it is arguable whether “rational analysis”
of the incest prohibition – including a successful constitutional challenge to an incest statute in
Israel – has in fact led to its decline. Quite the contrary, incest continues to anchor the slippery
slope, one that has been instrumental in shaping public opinion as well as the law itself.
How might we then account for the persistence and persuasive force of incest as the
abyss that yawns at the bottom of the slippery slope in legal and political debate over the
regulation of intimate relationships? I would argue that the only way that we can begin to
understand the position that incest occupies on the slippery slope, is to understand the logic of
disgust that underlies the incest taboo. Specifically, the slippery slope at least theoretically
assumes that a line can be drawn somewhere on the slope – a toehold, so to speak – at the point
91
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where behavior causes harm. As Parts III and IV will show in greater detail, however, disgust is
an emotion that is triggered in response to even harmless situations. The principle of disgust
suggests that even if we could draw a line between harmful and harmless incest on the slippery
slope, it is largely irrelevant because individuals would find even harmless incest to be a source
of disgust.
Recognizing precisely why many forms of incest are a source of disgust is critical to
understanding the power of the taboo as well as why it has been routinelydeployed against a
range of relationships, from interracial to same-sex relations. In the next Part, I pose the
following questions in order to clarify the precise threat that incest represents: Is incest
disgusting because it is harmful? Or does incest provoke a reflexive, almost instinctive revulsion
even in the absence of harm? Clarifying whether, why, and the extent to which laws prohibiting
incest are motivated by disgust, will help to provide the necessary framework for approaching
the broader question of precisely why, and how, the incest taboo has been used to articulate a
normative vision of the family.

Part III

Incest and Harm

In her recent work on disgust, Martha Nussbaum has suggested that, while harm might
provide a “prima facie case for legal regulation,” revulsion, or disgust, alone is never enough.92
If that is correct, then it is important to determine whether laws against incest derive from a
proper understanding of harm and whether a “prima facie case for legal regulation” of incest can
be made. If so, then at the very least we might be able to justify those laws and mark a line
beyond which certain kinds of incest are harmful and thus warrant regulation. If, however, laws
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against incest, even otherwise harmless incest, derive mainly from revulsion, then it is difficult
to determine exactly where that “line” should be drawn, which suggests that any form of linedrawing is purely arbitrary. More important, if the taboo has come to symbolize the revulsion
surrounding even harmless sexual behavior, then this would provide a firm basis for criticizing
the extent to which the taboo has been used in slippery slope arguments against otherwise
consensual (and harmless) sexual relationships.

A.

Harm-Based Rationales for Laws Against Incest

The two most common arguments that incest is harmful, and thus demands regulation,
are that consanguineous reproduction increases the chance for genetic abnormalities and that
intra-familial sexual relations are abusive. Indeed, the mere mention of incest summons images
of ‘backwoods’ children and the specter of child sexual abuse. While it is for partly these
reasons that incest provokes disgust, neither of these rationales provides a complete account of
the taboo’s persistence as a symbol of sexual deviance.
Courts have sometimes referred to either one, or both, of these harm-based rationales for
sustaining laws against incest. For instance, in Israel v. Allen, discussed in Part II, the Colorado
Supreme Court turned to biology (or genetic harm) when stating that “objections that exist
against consanguineous marriages are not present where the relationship is merely by affinity.
The physical detriment to the offspring of persons related by blood is totally absent.”93
Similarly, in In re: Tiffany Nicole M., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals adverted to biology when
recognizing that “genetic mutation” is one of the many consequences of incest.94 In addition,
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courts have also justified laws against incest on the ground that incest is tantamount to child
sexual abuse. For instance, in Kaiser v. State, the Washington Court of Appeals stated that
“[p]revention of mutated birth is only one reason for these statutes. The crime is also punished to
promote and protect family harmony, [and] to protect children from the abuse of parental
authority. . . .”95
Each of these rationales fails to explain why incest elicits disgust. Considering first the
genetic rationale, it would be difficult to argue that the mere fact that a child is born with
recessive genetic traits is in itself offensive; any number of children from non-incestuous unions
are born with such traits and we would not say that they necessarily elicit disgust. Rather, what
could very well be deemed offensive, and thus legally prohibited, is the fact that parents might
put their future progeny in harm’s way by increasing the risk that they will be born with such
traits. But even this harm does not entirely explain the revulsion triggered by incest specifically
or why certain kinds of incest are illegal. For instance, even when there is a strong likelihood
that each parent carries a recessive trait, as in the case of Tay-Sachs disease in the Ashkenazi
Jewish community, we do not require non-related parents to undergo genetic testing prior to
having children to determine whether the child or children will be born with a genetic
abnormality. In addition, even if non-related parents knew that they each carried a recessive trait
and nevertheless decided to have children, it is unlikely that we would label that decision as
disgusting per se – while certainly risky and perhaps even irresponsible, probably not disgusting.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of Georgia had these inconsistencies in mind when it altogether
discounted biology (or genetic harm) as a valid justification for the incest taboo. In Benton v.
State, 96 the Georgia court found that the state’s criminal incest law applied to stepfamilies and
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biological families alike, reasoning that “the taboo is neither instinctual nor biological, and it has
very little to do with actual blood ties. This is evident by the fact that the taboo is often violated –
people generally are incapable of violating their instincts – and because society condemned
incest long before people knew of its genetic effects.”97
Considering now the child sexual abuse rationale, it is unclear whether the thought of
child abuse elicits disgust in the same way as does incest. As with related parents who place
their progeny in harm’s way by increasing the risk of recessive chromosomal traits, it is plausible
that we would find sexually abusive parents and parent-figures disgusting because they severely
harm their biological, adoptive, or stepchildren physically as well as psychologically. At the
same time, however, child abuse and incest represent different orders of magnitude on the
revulsion scale, largely because incest represents much more than child abuse. Indeed, even in
the absence of abuse, it is likely that we would label the incestuous relationship disgusting. In
addition, and on a more practical level, if the harm that incest statutes are targeting is abuse, then
such harm is already adequately captured by statutes dealing with child abuse. As some
commentators have pointed out, “child sexual abuse” and “incest,” while used interchangeably,
do not have the same meaning. For instance, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
defines the former as “[c]ontacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is
being used for the sexual stimulation of that adult or another person.” By contrast, incest is
simply defined as “sexual relations between persons so closely related that marriage is legally
forbidden.”98
These harm-based rationales are an incomplete way of accounting for the disgust that
incest provokes and for why certain incestuous relationships must be legally prohibited. To be
97
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sure, the Israel court did draw a line between harmful and non-harmful incest on the basis of
genetics and biology – at the point where offspring might suffer “physical detriment.” At the
same time, however, the court there suggested that our disgust mechanisms are invariably
triggered by any sexual relationship between blood-related relatives, stating that “[t]he natural
repugnance of people toward marriages of blood relatives, that has resulted in well-nigh
universal moral condemnation of such marriages, is generally lacking in applications to the union
of those only related by affinity.”99 In other words, the Israel court assumed that all blood
relatives – presumably including cousins – have an innate aversion for incestuous relationships,
even biologically harmless incestuous relationships that might not necessarily involve sexual
reproduction. Through this one sweeping statement, the court neglected to consider the fact that
many blood relatives have entered into incestuous relationships in spite of this so-called
“natural” repugnance. Similarly, although the petitioners’ three children in the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals case, In re: Tiffany Nicole M., were healthy and seemingly free from chromosomal
defects, and although the court there noted that “[w]hether consanguineous mating causes
genetic defects may be more questionable than generally assumed,” it nevertheless evinced
disgust over the mere possibility of incest when it stated that “the incestuous parent by his
actions has demonstrated that the natural, moral constraint of blood relationship has failed to
prevent deviant conduct and thus cannot be relied upon to constrain similar conduct in the
future.”100 In other words, like the Israel court, the Tiffany Nicole M. court suggested that
something – a disgust mechanism, perhaps – exists in the “blood relationship” to prevent even
presumably harmless incest encounters. The courts’ rhetoric in these two opinions speaks to a
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much larger belief, shared by many, that incest is a source of disgust or repugnance even when it
does not result in harm, genetic or otherwise.

B.

Incest and the Insignificance of Harm

Aside from a few court opinions and vague public sentiment, is there more empiricallybased evidence that suggests that harm is irrelevant in the context of sexual taboos in general and
the incest taboo in particular? Research conducted over the last decade in the fields of cognitive
science and behavioral psychology suggests that this is likely the case, that is, that notions of
harm matter less in these particular contexts than we might have otherwise assumed. Scientists
in these fields increasingly have contended that “for affectively charged events such as incest and
other taboo violations, a [social] intuitionist model may be more plausible than a rationalist
model.”101 In so doing, they have challenged the widely-held assumption that moral judgment is
shaped by one’s perceptions of harm.
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The social intuitionist model claims that “moral judgment is caused byintuitive moral
impulses and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning.”102 According
to this model, moral judgments, like aesthetic judgments, are made quickly and intuitively –
particularly in response to scenarios, such as incest, that elicit disgust or extreme emotion.103
The “intuitionist” aspect of the model presumes that morality is driven by intuitions, which are
defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective
valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps
of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”104 The “social” aspect of the model
presumes that moral reasoning “is usually an ex post facto process used to influence the
intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people. In the social intuitionist model, one feels a
quick flash of revulsion at the thought of incest and one knows intuitively that something is
wrong.”105 When asked to justify one’s belief that something – like consensual, harmless incest
– is wrong, “[o]ne puts forth argument after argument,” and believes that he is right “even after
[his] last argument has been shot down. In the social intuitionist model it becomes plausible to
say, “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.”106
Jonathan Haidt, a key exponent of this model, has used it to examine the source of moral
angst over sexual taboos as well as to account for the various disagreements that have driven a
wedge between political conservatives and liberals over issues of sexual morality.107 For
example, in one study, Haidt interviewed self-identified conservatives and liberals in order to
102

Id.; see also Haidt, supra note _____, at 829 (“[t]he social intuitionist model . . . is not an antirationalist model.
It is a model about the complex and dynamic ways that intuition, reasoning, and social influences interact to produce
moral judgment”).
103
See id.; see also Rozin, Schweder, Andras & Angyal, Disgust and Related Aversions, 36 J. OF ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCH. 393 (1941) (analyzing the role that disgust plays in the formation of moral judgment).
104
Haidt, supra note _____, at 812.
105
Id.
106
Haidt, supra note _____, at 814.
107
See Jonathan Haidt, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. OF
APPLIED PSYCH. 191 (2001).

38

measure their reactions to three harmless, yet “offensive,” sexual taboo violations – same-sex
relations, masturbation (with a bestiality component), and consensual sibling incest – that were
then further subdivided into six scenarios intended to elicit varying degrees of disgust.108 The
results of the interviews supported their thesis that moral judgment was driven more by the nonconsequentialist and emotional reactions of disgust/offensiveness than by perceptions of harm.109
The researchers found that conservatives and liberals both responded to the six scenarios in quick
and immediate fashion, only later coming up with rationalizations such as “it is wrong because it
is harmful” or “it is wrong because, well, it just is” – even when the interviewers called attention
to the non-harmful aspects of each scenario.
Haidt’s study shows that political conservatives and liberals differed mostover their
affective responses to the same-sex scenarios and least over their affective responses to the incest
scenarios.110 Most striking, however, was the researchers’ conclusion that negative affect was
the most significant predictor of moral judgment for both groups. Whereas most liberals
espoused a harm-based morality (i.e., only those actions that cause harm are immoral) and most
conservatives espoused a broader morality (e.g., based on community norms and religious
108

The six scenarios included: a 27-year-old man having intercourse with a 25-year-old man who is his partner; a
30-year-old woman having oral sex with a 29-year-old woman who is her partner; a 34-year-old woman who enjoys
masturbating while cuddling with her favorite teddy bear; a 25-year-old man who prefers to masturbate while his
dog willingly licks his (the man’s) genitals and seems to enjoy it; a 29-year-old man and his 26-year-old girlfriend
who one day discover that they are half brother and sister (raised in separate families) although decide to continue
their sexual relationship anyway, using a condom; and a 25-year-old man and his 23-year-old adopted sister who
decide to have sexual intercourse. See id. at 193.
109
Haidt defines “affective condemnation” in terms synonymous with disgust: “The following two quotes illustrate
the [affective condemnation] code: ‘It’s more along the gross lines, sort of repelling. I just don’t think it’s normal’;
and ‘That’s foul, that’s nasty. I mean that’s not right. That’s not right.’” Id. at 201. To avoid a situation where
one’s perception of harm (what Haidt calls a moral content code) was indistinguishable from one’s affective
condemnation (harmful because disgusting and disgusting because harmful), the reliability of all codes for each
participant were computed. The interviewers also ran regression analyses in order to determine whether harm or
affect was a greater predictor of moral judgment regarding sexual choices.
110
For instance, whereas 0% of the liberals, and 40% of conservatives, interviewed exhibited a negative affective
response to gay male sex, 8% of both liberals and conservatives interviewed exhibited a negative affective response
to a sexual relationship between an adopted brother and sister. Similarly, whereas 7% of the liberals, and 60 % of
the conservatives, interviewed exhibited “dumbfounding,” or a confused inability to explain one’s position, with
respect to gay male sex, 42% of the liberals, and 50% of the conservatives, interviewed exhibited a dumbfounding
response to the sexual relationship between the siblings related by adoption. See id. at 209.

39

belief), for both groups, negative affect (or disgust) determined moral judgment more than any of
the other predictors in all of the scenarios – and particularly in the incest scenarios. While
conservatives and liberals disagreed most over their views toward same-sex relations, “[t]he
liberal insistence that people have a right to do whatever they choose, so long as they don’t hurt
anyone, did not extend to the powerful taboo against incest.”111 Haidt explains:
[M]oral judgment was better predicted by participants’ emotional reactions than
by their perceptions of harmfulness. Harm was often cited, especially on the
incest scenarios, but even there it was not a significant predictor of judgment,
once negative affect was included in the analysis. This finding fits with the
qualitative finding that participants often condemned the scenarios instantly, and
then seemed to search and stumble through sentences laced with pauses, “ums,”
and “I don’t knows,” before producing a statement about harm. This general
pattern of quick affective judgment and slow, awkward justification fits well with
an intuitionist model of moral judgment, while it does not fit will with models in
which moral reasoning drives moral judgment.
Haidt concludes his study by suggesting that “the best way to change moral judgments may be to
trigger competing moral intuitions” rather than by resorting to a process of argumentation that
“does not cause people to change their minds,” but rather “forces them to work harder to find
replacement arguments.”112
Like Haidt and his associates, Joshua Greene, a researcher at Princeton’s Center for the
Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, has conducted a series of magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) experiments that are designed to test the brain’s moral decision-making process.113 What
Greene and others have found strongly supportsHaidt’s theory behind the intuitionist model of
moral decision-making. Specifically, Greene has begun to uncover the distinctly neuronal
foundation of moral judgments. When posed a series of questions that implicated a wide
spectrum of moral issues, volunteers participating in the experiments relied on those parts of
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their brain that produce emotions and feelings of disgust and anger significantly more than on
those parts of the brain typically associated with the reasoning process. Based on a variety of
such experiments, Greene has concluded that emotions and intuitions play a critical – albeit
undervalued – role in the formation of moral judgment. He suggests that Hume, who believed
that moral judgment derived partly from an “immediate feeling and finer internal sense,” better
captured the etiology of moral judgment than did the primary modern exponents of moral
reasoning, Kant and Mill.
An understanding of the intuitionist model of moral judgment, and of the pivotal role
that emotions play in the decision-making process, is indispensable to any inquiry into the
relationship among disgust, incest, and perceptions of harmfulness for at least two reasons. First,
the model challenges the classic liberal or libertarian claim, enunciated by and commonly
associated with John Stuart Mill, that the government’s only role in the community is the
prevention of harm.114 The Millean position presupposes that, as long as an individual’s choices
do not result in harm to others, the state must refrain from intruding upon or constricting them –
including, presumably, choices pertaining to one’s sexuality or sexual behavior. This classic
harm-based, or consequentialist, position has been widely embraced in American law. Indeed,
one might even say that it has shaped the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence
and was an integral feature of the majority’s opinion in Lawrence.115 The intuitionist model,
however, not only questions the importance of harm in the formation of moral judgment, but also
suggests that the classic liberal paradigm is prescriptive of the way people should think rather
than descriptive of the way they do think.
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For instance, one might argue, as some commentators have, that it is possible to draw a
line on the slippery slope (from sodomy to incest or from same-sex marriage to incestuous
marriage) at the point where one’s sexual preferences or sexual choices inflict harm on others.
At first glance, this position would appear to defuse the slippery slope argument by providing a
firm toehold on the slope itself: Of course we are not going to slip down the slope to incest
because, given our Millean leanings, we know that a line can be drawn at harm, whether that
harm is the coercive nature of any incestuous act or the increased biological risk that
consanguineous reproduction poses. The intuitionist model, however, suggests that whether a
line theoretically can be drawn on the slippery slope is of little to no consequence, for
individuals will inevitably find that certain sexual taboos – same-sex relations but incest more so
– are worthy of our moral condemnation regardless of whether they cause harm to others. The
consensual incest encounters in Haidt’s study offer representative examples of precisely this
phenomenon. While harm was one predictor of moral judgment, it paled in comparison to the
more decisive role of negative affect. These empirically-based conclusions, which suggest that
morality is driven largely by disgust, are more in line with Lord Patrick Devlin’s assertion that
disgust is among the primary “forces behind the moral law”116 than with Mill’s harm principle.
Second, and more relevant here, the intuitionist model provides an explanation for why
the incest taboo has continued to remain a key player in the culture wars over sexuality, despite
the fact that not all incest causes harm. As Haidt points out, incest was the only sexual taboo in
his study that elicited extreme affective condemnation or disgust from political conservatives and
liberals alike. That moral disapprobation for incest supersedes political affiliation offers one
possible explanation for why incest has maintained its position at the bottom of the slippery
116
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slope, namely, because everybody is repulsed by it. The conservative juxtaposition of same-sex
relations and incest is an opportune way of winning the debate by starting from a point of
agreement – that incest is disgusting and must therefore be avoided at all costs, even if that
means that some people in the mix might end up sacrificing a cause which they tend to support,
such as same-sex marriage.117 In this sense, incest performs the powerful role of contaminating
anything that becomes associated with it. As I shall suggest in the next Part, placing incest
alongside other taboos (same-sex relations, miscegenation, cloning) makes those taboos start to
look more and more like incest.118
Because harm is an incomplete way of explaining the potency of the incest taboo, we
must turn to other theories in order to account for the extreme disgust that incest provokes. In
the next Part, I shall set forth one possible theory of disgust that more fully captures the reasons
why the incest taboo has come to symbolize any non-normative family arrangement and why it
has surfaced during moments of perceived crisis (on the slippery slope) when the law demands a
clear-cut definition of the family.

Part IV

Incest and The Logic of Disgust

Among the many possible reasons why individuals find incest – and the other taboos to
which it is (or was) compared – to be a source of disgust, is the extent to which it represents an
archetypal form of boundary violation. Section A will provide the critical background in support
of this theory. Section B will then apply this theory to incest specifically. Section C will again
rely on this theory to explain how, and why, incest has functioned as a point of comparison to
other non-normative family arrangements. This more comprehensive theory of incest as a
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prototypical symbol of boundary violation will help to explain why incest has continued to
remain a monolithic taboo on the slippery slope – the incest taboo – in spite of the problems
highlighted in Part II.

A.

Disgust and Boundary Violation

Paul Rozin, among the first scholars to lend intellectual respectability to the study of
disgust, once remarked to an interviewer that “[d]isgust evolves culturally, and develops from a
system to protect the body from harm to a system to protect the soul from harm.”119 Rozin’s
inquiry into the nature of disgust starts with what he refers to as the core “elicitors” of disgust,
including “food, body products, [and] animals” and their wastes.120 Moving centrifugally out
from these core elicitors, Rozin identifies additional corporeally-related, disgust-eliciting
phenomena, including “sexual behaviors, contact with death or corpses, violations of the exterior
envelope of the body (including gore and deformity) [and] poor hygiene.”121 Rozin and his
colleagues have concluded that these disgust elicitors share a common theoretical substrate,
namely, they all constitute “reminders of our animal vulnerability” and serve to humanize “our
animal bodies.”122
Our revulsion reflexes, however, are not limited to these largely physical and bodily
phenomena, but rather extend to social phenomena as well, including “interpersonal
contamination (contact with unsavory human beings) and certain moral offenses.”123 While the
“presumed origin of disgust [is] a rejection response to bad tastes, in the service of protecting the
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body,” it branches out to encompass a range of cultural and moral activity, such that disgust
might be conceived of as serving the purpose of “protecting the soul.”124 In fact, Rozin explains
that “[w]hen we elicited lists of disgusting things from North American and Japanese informants,
we found that the majority of instances referred to moral offenses.”125 For instance, a high
number of informants alternatively characterized racists, Republicans, and liberals as
“disgusting.”126 Furthermore, Rozin notes that “the broad expansion of the word disgusting into
the sociomoral domain” is not simply a metaphorical extension of the “core” feeling of disgust;
nor is it unique to the English language, but rather characterizes a number of languages and
cultures. As with the core disgust elicitors, socio-moral disgust arises from a fear of boundary
violation (and ensuing contamination) and necessitates the imposition of boundaries in the
human body-politic. Although Rozin and his colleagues thus locate the origin of disgust in a
“particular motivational system (hunger) and [. . .] a particular part of the body (mouth),” they
also underscore the distinctly social and cultural functions of a more fully developed sense of
disgust – noting that “along with fear, [disgust] is a primary means for socialization.”127 A more
common example might be the way in which the word “dirty,” which denotes the actual
substance of dirt, has expanded to connote that which is unclean and that which sullies in a moral
sense (e.g., dirty magazines, dirty talk, dirty sex).
Anthropologists and researchers in other fields have also called attention to the
relationship among disgust, socialization, contamination, and boundary maintenance. Most
notably, in her seminal work, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and

124
125
126
127

Id.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 638.

45

Taboo,128 Mary Douglas elucidates the greater social function of ritualistic pollution behaviors or
disgust reactions.129 Like Rozin, Douglas highlights the relationship between disgust and the
socialization process, maintaining that “pollutions are used as analogies for expressing a general
view of the social order.”130 More specifically, “our pollution behaviour is the reaction which
condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications.”131 More
than Rozin, Douglas conceptualizes the socio-moral domain of disgust within the larger context
of boundary maintenance. As creatures of order and “tidiness” with an obsessive need to classify
and categorize, humans are compelled to draw boundaries and to banish the anomaly, that is,
anything that does not quite conform to the bounded space that we have fashioned:
In a chaos of shifting impressions, each of us constructs a stable world in which
objects have recognizable shapes, are located in depth, and have permanence. In
perceiving we are building, taking some cues and rejecting others. The most
acceptable cues are those which fit most easily into the pattern that is being built
up. Ambiguous ones tend to be treated as if they harmonized with the rest of the
pattern. Discordant ones tend to be rejected. If they are accepted the structure of
assumptions has to be modified. As learning proceeds objects are named. Their
names then affect the way they are perceived next time: once labeled they are
more speedily slotted into the pigeon holes in the future. As time goes on and
experiences pile up, we make a greater and greater investment in our system of
labels. So a conservative bias is built in. It gives us confidence.132
Among her more specific case examples of the practical function of boundary control, Douglas
points to the North African Nuers, whose taboos against incest and adultery ensure the stability
and structure of marriage as an exogamic necessity.133
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Douglas’ analysis of taboos underscores a key feature of taboos and pollution rituals,
namely, the importance of border control and policing the line separating this from that, us from
them. Her description of the boundary maintenance function of taboos and pollution rituals
captures what Pierre Schlag has referred to as one of the law’s foundational aesthetics, namely,
the aesthetic of the grid. More precisely, Schlag points out that the “principal role of the judge in
the grid aesthetic is to police the grid.” He further remarks that this prototypical “grid thinker is
preoccupied with the proper location and maintenance of boundaries: ‘Where do we draw the
line?’ ‘Will the line hold?’ ‘How do we avoid the slippery slope?’”134 In fact, Schlag’s
description of the grid aesthetic and its penchant for “tidiness” not only reveals the role that the
slippery slope performs in the politics of disgust, but also recalls Douglas’ description of the
boundary control function of taboo. He continues:
Understandably, the recurrent contact with societal untidiness elicits in legal
professionals a desire for an antiseptic law. The grid can be seen as an attempt to
shield the lawyer, the judge, and the law itself from contamination. In this light,
the grid can be seen as an attempt to ward off contamination. The most
prestigious precincts of the law are the most antiseptic, the most clearly marked
off from the mess. . . . Both the appellate judge and the academic can become
entranced with maintaining or perfecting the grid at the expense of attending to its
worldly implications. This is the allure of law cast as geometry. This is the
formalist orientation par excellence: the dominance of concern with maintaining
the proper form and order of law in terms of its own criteria.135
The similarities between Douglas’ analysis of taboo and Schlag’s articulation of one of the law’s
foundational aesthetics underlines the extent to which taboo and disgust are constitutive of the
law as well as the metaphors – slippery slopes, line drawing – in which it speaks.136 This
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peculiar relationship between sexual taboo and border control (or policing the line) is perhaps
nowhere more clearly dramatized in the law governing sexuality than in the recent expansion of
state “mini-DOMAs” as a means of ensuring that state recognition of one sexual taboo – in that
case, same-sex marriage – does not “seep over” the borders and contaminate less tolerant states.
More recent inquiries into the etiology of disgust have expanded on Douglas’ original
formulation of taboo as a kind of boundary control as well as on Rozin’s understanding of the
relationship between disgust and the socialization process. William Ian Miller, for instance,
posits that disgust “is especially useful and necessary as a builder of moral and social
community. It performs this function obviously by helping define and locate the boundary
separating our group from their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the inviolable.”137
Summarizing the pioneering work of Rozin and others, Miller points out that disgust performs
the function of conveying a negative emotion toward the incorporation or assimilation of a
contaminant. More important, though, Miller, like Rozin before him, demonstrates the extent to
which disgust performs the related, but more overtly political and social functions of maintaining
rank and hierarchy. He elaborates:
Our very core, our soul, is hemmed in by barriers of disgust, and one does not
give them up unless one is in love or is held at the point of a gun. In fact, the
claim seems to be that the core or the essence of one’s identity can only be known
as a consequence of which passions are triggered in its defense. Disgust’s
durability, its relative lack of responsiveness to the will, suits it well to its role as
the maintainer of the continuity of our core character across social and moral
domains. Our durable self is defined as much by disgust as by any other passion.
Disgust defines many of our tastes, our sexual proclivities, and our choices of
intimates. It installs large chunks of the moral world right at the core of our
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identity, seamlessly uniting body and soul and thereby giving an irreducible
continuity to our characters.”138
Some commentators, such as Nussbaum, have been far more critical of Miller’s characterization
of disgust as both foundational and necessary. In fact, she mildly criticizes Miller for neglecting
to discuss the normative implications of his social theory of disgust.139 Regardless of what we
might think of Miller’s assessment of disgust as a normative matter, however, his analysis is
nevertheless descriptively useful because it highlights the dual function of disgust: Its ability at
once to separate (to draw boundaries between and among individuals and groups) and to unite
(“hemming in” and “seamlessly uniting body and soul” as well as individuals within the
community at large). As one scholar has explained the unlikely conflation of sexual offenses in
Deuteronomy and Leviticus, including incest, same-sex relations, bestiality, and adultery, “all
these offenses have this in common: not separating that which should be separated, mixing that
which should be kept apart, and confusing genera, sexes, kinship, and alliance.”140
This boundary control theory is a particularly useful way of critiquing not only the
position that incest occupies on the slippery slope, but also the association made between incest
and other forms of sexual (and reproductive) deviance. We might even say that the slippery
slope, which itself lacks fixed boundaries (it is, after all, a slope) and which suggests an
imminent slip into the vast unknown, is the ideal rhetorical device or vehicle for conveying
disgust. The slippery slope often assumes a world lacking in difference and distinction – because
A is too much like B, we cannot allow A – features which, I have shown, characterize disgust. It
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is not surprising, then, that slippery slope arguments often appear in debates surrounding tabooed
forms of sexuality and the revulsion they elicit and that incest has figured so prominently in
slippery slope rhetoric.

B.

Incest and Boundary Violation

One way to approach the question of how incest represents a prototypical form of
boundary violation is to return to Douglas’ conceptualization of disgust (or pollution behavior)
as a reaction against that which defies or confuses our “cherished classifications.” Specifically,
in the same quotation excerpted above, Douglas calls attention to the causal relationship that
exists between taboo and naming. She notes that as “learning proceeds objects are named. Their
names then affect the way they are perceived next time: once labeled they are more speedily
slotted into the pigeon holes in the future. As time goes on and experiences pile up, we make a
greater and greater investment in our system of labels.”141 Douglas’ examination of the naming
process is a useful heuristic by which to approach the peculiar relationship that exists between
names – or naming – and incest as well as the theoretical claim that naming and the incest taboo
often go hand-in-hand. Indeed, scholars from a number of different disciplines have taken up
Claude Lèvi-Strauss’ suggestion, made in 1949, that only by “pursuing the comparison” between
language and the incest taboo can we “hope to get to the meaning of the institution” of exogamic
marriage and of the role that the taboo plays in ensuring that institution.
For instance, psychologists have remarked that familial names – mother, father, sister,
brother – perform a prescriptive as well as a descriptive function. One scholar comments that
“[t]he incest taboo exerts its effect on the use of names,” specifically, that
141
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[w]ith the use of the terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’ instead of proper names such as
Sally and John, one is describing a part of the individual, a function (one who
mothers or fathers), and not the total person including his feelings, sexuality,
desires, etc. Using the mother’s proper name would make her too much like a
‘real’ person or a peer, with whom all is possible, and the incestuous conflict
together with wishes and anxieties would be reawakened . . . . This verbal
institution serves to maintain and support the incest taboo.142
Similarly, anthropologists have noted that “[t]he naming function of language by which we assert
the father/mother/sister/brother/uncle/aunt/cousin placement may well be one of the strongest
announcers and enforcers of the taboo.”143 This idea that intrafamilial naming represents a
“semiotics of incest”144 – or what I would call the “grammar” of incest – resonates with Douglas’
observation that language constructs categories which, in turn, reinforce social behavior. In
other words, “[t]he process of naming is the process of categorizing, which is the unconscious
establishment of limits, in [the case of the incest taboo] sexual limits.”145 It is this very
relationship between naming and taboo that prompted David Schneider to remark that incest
represents a way of acting “ungrammatically.”
The disgust triggered by incest derives from precisely this sense of name or boundary
violation: One should not be in a sexual relationship with someone whom they call brother or
sister (or mother, or father, etc.). Even brothers and sisters who are not biologically related but
fully naturalized into the family unit – say, through adoption, the aim of which is to incorporate
the child into the “natural” family146 – become part of these nominal categories that comprise the
“semiotics of incest.” In families where adopted children and siblings are fully naturalized into
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the family, one would suspect that this “naming function” would work in the same way to
enforce the taboo against sexual relations. Such a claim is supported by empirical evidence, for
in Haidt’s study, the adopted brother and sister sexual scenario elicited nearly the same degree of
disgust as did the scenario involving siblings who were related by blood through one parent.147
However, in families where adopted children are not considered to be fully naturalized into the
family, one would suspect that the naming function does not operate in the same way. As legal
commentators have argued, one of the reasons why some states do not apply their incest
prohibitions to adopted brothers and sisters and/or to stepsiblings (related only by marriage) is
because the law in these states still does not consider those individuals to be naturalized into the
family unit – and, by extension, a ‘real’ family in the normative sense.
The Israel decision represents a good example of this phenomenon. There, the court
employed a botanical metaphor to suggest that adopted children do not become fully naturalized
into the family tree, stating that “adopted children are not engrafted upon their adoptive families
for all purposes.”148 Other courts, however, have found that adoptive siblings are fully
naturalized – and thus subject to the incest taboo. The Israel court’s repetition of the phrase
“adopted brother and sister” and “brother and sister related only by adoption” suggests that the
semiotics of incest did not apply here because the court was dealing with an “adopted brother”
and “adopted sister,” rather than a real “brother” and “sister.” The fact that the court found
otherwise reveals the pivotal role that the law plays in creating these names, categories, and the
legal relationships that they signify.
In addition to the rich anthropological literature on the subject, judges, policymakers, and
even poets have elucidated the relationship that exists between naming and the incest taboo.
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Their observations reveal the extent to which the disgust thatincest provokes derives from the
fact that boundaries have been violated and those “cherished classifications” that we live by have
been called into question.
For instance, in upholding laws criminalizing incest against constitutional challenge,
courts have underscored the extent to which incest leads to a confusion of names and roles within
the family. As one court noted:
Prevention of mutated birth is only one reason for these statutes. The crime is also
punished to promote and protect family harmony, to protect children from the
abuse of parental authority, and because society cannot function in an orderly
manner when age distinctions, generations, sentiments and roles in families are in
conflict.149
Other courts have similarly observed that, rather than representing an instinctual aversion or a
guard against genetic abnormalities, the primary function of the incest taboo is to maintain the
nominal and symbolic hierarchy of the family unit.150 For instance, in Benton v. State, the
Georgia Supreme Court remarked that the incest taboo does not reflect an innate repugnance to
incestuous relationships, but rather polices boundaries by forcing “family members to go outside
their families to find sexual partners. Requiring people to pursue relationships outside family
boundaries helps to form important economic and political alliances, and makes a larger society
possible.”151 In addition, the taboo helps to maintain “the stability of the family hierarchy by
protecting young family members from exploitation by older family members in positions of
authority, and by reducing competition and jealous friction among family members.”152
The relationship between the incest taboo and the maintenance of names and the familial
hierarchy has been conveyed in more poetic fashion by one of the more infamous figures in
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Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Myrrha, who repeatedly tricks her father into having sex with her – and
who eventually turns into a tree as a form of punishment for so doing.153 While contemplating
the possibility of father-daughter incest early in Ovid’s narrative of forbidden desire, Myrrha
conjures up an absurd world where incest dissolves linguistic boundaries and the relationships
that they signify. As she soliloquizes: “But can you hope for aught else, unnatural girl? Think
how many ties, how many names you are confusing! Will you be the rival of your mother, the
mistress of your father? Will you be called the sister of your son, the mother of your brother?”154
For Myrrah, incest is unnatural not because of the desire itself – as she proclaims earlier in her
soliloquy, the natural love that exists between father and daughter is merely increased or
“twinned” by a sexual bond – but rather because of the unnatural crisis of naming and the
dissolution of the familial hierarchy that it produces. Ovid’s legendary narrative of fatherdaughter incest is not the only story in the Metamorphoses to explore the subject of forbidden
desire in terms that suggest boundary violation and name confusion. To the contrary, Ovid
similarly conceptualizes a number of sexual relationships in the Metamorphoses that are either in
fact incestuous or described in language evocative of incest, including twin brother-sister incest,
self-love, and artistic creation. In all of these narratives, Ovid makes clear that the nominal
transgression – e.g., what to “call” your brother should he become your lover – is an
indispensable part of the sexual transgression.155
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The theory of incest and disgust that I have proposed here reveals the extent to which
disgust is a socially (and society) contingent category, dependent on how we choose to
categorize and name objects and people. In other words, that which is an object of disgust in one
social context might be entirely acceptable – even encouraged – in another. But what does this
theory of disgust tell us about the incest taboo specifically? On the most basic level, it suggests
that, even as the incest taboo appears on the slippery slope as something monolithic (the incest
taboo) and is thought to derive from an instinctive sense of repugnance, the horror surrounding
incest is in many ways socially determined. For instance, while the thought of brother-sister
incest might provoke horror for some, for others it is an entirely natural manifestation of desire.
As Nussbaum has commented with respect to Siegmund’s love for Sieglinde in Wagner’s Die
Walkure, the “lovers are drawn to one another not in spite of the tie, but precisely because of it:
they seem to see their own faces in one another, and to hear their own voices.”156 Indeed, one
would be misguided to argue that certain individuals lack the “instinct” to refrain from
committing incest. As the Benton court remarked, “people are generally incapable of violating
their instincts.” Or, as Françoise Héritier has argued in her cross-cultural examination of the
incest taboo,
One might . . . consider Sir James Frazer’s counterargument: Why would a deep
human instinct need to be reinforced by law? What nature forbids and punishes
does not require a law as well. There is no law obliging people to eat or drink,
preventing them from placing their hands in fire, and so on. The very existence of
a legal ban would, on the contrary, lead one to infer the existence of a natural
one time recognized that incestuous desire can constitute a natural extension of the affection that already exists.
Specifically, in considering whether to recognize a marriage between an aunt and a nephew that was contracted in
Italy, the New York Court of Domestic Relations in Incuria v. Incuria suggested that the incestuous relationship was
the natural outgrowth of the familial one: “There was probably affection between the parties; that would naturally
flow from the relationship existing between them.” 155 Misc. 755, 280 N.Y.S. 716 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1935)
(emphasis added). Incuria is singular in its recognition that incestuous desire might in some way “naturally flow”
from the pre-existing familial relationship. While more often than not a source of disgust and repugnance to
outsiders, this kind of relationship, as Nussbaum points out and as I have argued elsewhere, is in some sense a
logical outgrowth of the affection that already exists.
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instinct toward incest. We know the use Sigmund Freud made of this argument in
Totem and Taboo.157
This claim that the incest taboo is more nurture than nature supports the observations
made in Parts I and II of this Article with respect to the position that the incest taboo maintains
on the slippery slope. Specifically, I there suggested that while the taboo might function in
slippery slope arguments as something staid and untouchable (again, the incest taboo), the law of
incest suggests that it is less definite, more wide-ranging, and society specific.What may be
deemed incestuous (and thus prohibited) in one state or country, may be permitted – indeed,
encouraged – in another.158 Despite this definitional variety, however, the incest taboo continues
to appear in slippery slope rhetoric as a single and monolithic taboo. In looking more closely at
the way in which the incest taboo has been used to articulate an ideal vision of the family in Part
V, I shall return to this notion that the definition of incest is a prescriptive, ideological choice
rather than a factual description of the way in which families naturally operate.
In addition, this theory of disgust as a form of boundary violation helps to explain why
incest has been compared to other non-normative behaviors – including, at one time,
miscegenation, and, more recently, same-sex relations and cloning. I have already examined the
incest – same-sex relations parallel to some extent throughout this Article, and will return to this
comparison in Part V. Here, I turn instead to comparisons between incest and the two other nonnormative kinships arrangements. I contend that the incest-miscegenation and incest-cloning
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analogies help to bring into focus the peculiar boundary violation that incest represents and the
disgust that it provokes. Furthermore, an examination of these analogies provides a context in
which to discuss, and ultimately to criticize, the way in which the incest taboo has been used to
define acceptable forms of sexuality and kinship.

C.

The Incest - Miscegenation/Cloning Analogies

1.

Incest – Miscegenation Analogy

As discussed in Part I, incest once played a key role on – or at the bottom of – the
slippery slope from miscegenation to incest. Prior to Loving v. Virginia, incest was not only a
feared result of the decriminalization of miscegenation, but was, in fact, used synonymously with
that term. Most remarkably, in his Treatise on Sociology: Theoretical and Practical, written in
1852, white supremacist and pro-slavery apologist, Henry Hughes, proclaimed that interracial
and intrafamilial sexual relations and marriage were alike incestuous:
Races must not be wronged. Hygienic progress is a right. It is a right, because a
duty. But hygienic progress forbids ethnical regress. Morality therefore, which
commands generally progress, prohibits this special regress. The preservation and
progress of a race, is a moral duty of the races. Degeneration is evil. It is a sin.
That sin is extreme.
Hybridism is heinous. Impurity of races is against the law of nature.
Mulattoes are monsters. The law of nature is the law of God. The same law
which forbids consanguineous amalgamation forbids ethnical amalgamation.
Both are incestuous. Amalgamation is incest.159
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Hughes’ rhetoric reveals the extent to which miscegenation and incest were seen to be not just
similar to each other – objects of frequent comparison and juxtaposition – as so-called biological
hazards, but the same as each other.160
Incest and miscegenation were together considered to be dangerous solvents of the wellpoliced boundaries that guaranteed one’s biological, social, and even proprietary inheritance; in
fact, the taboo against one was often used to sustain the taboo against the other. These
complementary prohibitions against intrafamilial and interracial marriage – both of which,
curiously, were often referred to as “intermarriage” – were often juxtaposed as ‘crimes of blood’
in state statutory schemes and judicial decisions.
For instance, a Mississippi statute from 1880 suggested that interracial marriage was a
kind of incest, providing that a “marriage [that] is prohibited by law by reason of race or blood”
is “declared to be incestuous and void.”161 Similarly, a 1911 Nebraska statute defined as
“illegitimate” children produced through either incestuous or interracial marriage: “Upon the
dissolution by decree or sentence of nullity of any marriage that is prohibited on account of
consanguinity between the parties, or of any marriage between a white person and a negro, the
issue of the marriage shall be deemed to be illegitimate.”162 The frequency with which criminal
and civil prohibitions against miscegenation and incest appeared in either the same code section,
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or consecutive sections, suggests the extent to which the two crimes of blood reflected and
reinforced each other.163
Likely influenced by the frequent juxtaposition of incest and miscegenation in state
statutes, courts during this period also conceptualized incest and miscegenation as analogous
crimes. For instance, in considering the validity of an interracial marriage contracted outside
Oklahoma, where such marriages were prohibited, the Oklahoma Supreme Court proclaimed in
1924 that
[i]n the case at bar the marriage was impossible under the statute, going out of the
state to escape the statute, and going through the form of marriage in a state where
the inhibition did not exist, and soon thereafter returning to this state, and all in an
effort to accomplish indirectly what cannot be done directly, would be a fraud
upon the laws of this state by a citizen of this state, and such a marriage cannot be
recognized by the courts, neither can it be ratified or in any manner become legal
by time or change or age or conduct of the parties. The inhibition, like the
incestuous marriage, is in the blood, and the reason for it is stronger still.164
The Oklahoma court’s understanding of the instinctive character of the taboos against
miscegenation and incest – the legal prohibition against blood-mixing naturally existing in the
blood – anticipates more contemporary pronouncements with respect to humans’ so-called
instinctual aversion to incest. As noted above, in Israel v. Allen, the Colorado Supreme Court
averred that individuals have a “natural repugnance” toward marriages between blood
relatives.165 Similarly, in Tiffany Nicole M., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated that “the
incestuous parent by his actions has demonstrated that the natural, moral constraint of blood
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relationship has failed to prevent deviant conduct and thus cannot be relied upon to constrain
similar conduct in the future.”166
That the two taboos were cast in terms of each other is striking in light of the fact that,
whereas incest signified the unnatural mixing of the same, miscegenation signified the unnatural
mixing of the dissimilar. In commenting on this strange conflation of blood crimes in the
infamous denunciation of Henry Hughes, one scholar has noted that “Hughes transforms the
hybrid or mulatto from someone who is considered ‘impure’ because he combines qualities that
are too different to mix successfully, . . . to someone whose ‘impurity’ and transgressions lie in
the blending of traits that are, by contrast, too much alike.”167 In fact, it would appear that the
incest prohibition, which functions in a positive way to ensure or compel marriage outside the
family, would itself create the conditions that make miscegenation possible. More precisely, the
more restrictive the intrafamilial prohibition, the more likely that one would go outside her
family to find a marital (and/or sexual) partner. At the same time, the potent taboo against
miscegenation – particularly in the rural South – made the threat of incest that much more real.168
In this sense, then, the taboo against miscegenation logically followed from, and was
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necessitated by, the taboo against incest, and vice versa; sexual and marriage partners could be
neither too similar to the self (incest) nor too different from the self (miscegenation).169
While the routine juxtaposition of these seemingly non-complementary taboos might be
accounted for in a number of additional ways, including fears about miscegenation increasing the
actual potential for incest,170 I will focus here on concerns relating to the theory of disgust as
boundary violation. First, linked to concerns over one’s genetic inheritance, the incestmiscegenation analogy reflected an acute anxiety with respect to what was termed as one’s
“social inheritance.” For instance, dissenting in Perez v. Lippold, Justice Schenk, while
recognizing the potential benefits of “unrestricted racial intercrossing,” nevertheless noted that
“[r]ace crossings disturb social inheritance. That is one of its worst features.”171 Similarly, in
Berea College v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of Appeals presaged the dangers of “social
amalgamation” when considering whether a law prohibiting the mixing of African Americans
and whites in a single school violated the state and federal constitutions. The court there
declared that “[t]he natural separation of the races is . . . an undeniable fact, and all social
organizations which lead to their amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature. From social
amalgamation it is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage.”172 In this
sense, blood or biology functioned as a metaphor for social relations, as “social practices” were
169
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cast as “biological essences” and vice versa.173 Eva Saks has provided a persuasive and
comprehensive account of the constellation of issues surrounding the miscegenation hysteria, one
that created and heavily relied on the metaphor of “blood” as a means of “consolidating social
and economic boundaries.”174 Eugenic or hereditary concerns thus reflected a much greater
anxiety over the symbolic maintenance of social (marital, sexual) and economic (inheritance,
property-related) boundaries between blacks and whites.
Second, the biological mixing of blood found its legal counterpart in the numerous
conflict of laws cases in which questions of the validity of interracial and/or incestuous marriage
often arose. The fear of interstate contamination was most viciously expressed in a dissenting
opinion in State v. Ross.175 In that case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered
whether to recognize a marriage between an African-American man and a white woman that was
validly contracted in South Carolina, but prohibited and subject to criminal penalties under North
Carolina’s anti-miscegenation statute. While recognizing that “a marriage between persons of
different races [might be] as unnatural and as revolting as an incestuous one, and is declared void
by the law of North Carolina,” a majority of the court nevertheless quashed the indictment,
reasoning that “it is desirable . . . that there should not be one law in Maine and another in Texas,
but that the same law shall prevail at least throughout the United States.”176
Dissenting in Ross, Justice Reade employed the language of border control to assert that
“[n]o nation is bound to admit the laws and customs of another nation within its borders” and
that “[i]f such a marriage solemnized here between our people is declared void, why should
comity require the evil to be imported from another State? Why is not the relation severed the
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instant they set foot upon our soil?”177 In addition, and more contemptuous still, the dissenting
Justice invoked a series of animal and disease metaphors to convey the disgust elicited by this
failure of boundary maintenance:
[The] provision in the Constitution of the United States, “The citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States,” does not mean that a citizen of South Carolina removing here may bring
with him his South Carolina privileges and immunities; but that when he comes
here he may have the same privileges and immunities which our citizens have.
Nothing more and nothing less. It is courteous for neighbors to visit and it is
handsome to allow the visitor family privileges and even to give him the favorite
seat; but if he bring his pet rattlesnake or his bear or spitz dog famous for
hydrophobia, he must leave them outside the door. And if he bring small pox the
door may be shut against him.178
Justice Reade’s vivid characterization of boundary control in the Ross dissent resonates with
Miller’s cultural and sociological account of disgust, which, he suggests, builds moral and social
community “by helping to define and locate the boundary separating our group from their group,
purity from pollution, the violable from the inviolable.”179 Indeed, it is likely no coincidence that
metaphors signifying a failure of boundary maintenance, and the disgust it elicits, appear in an
opinion that takes up the question of miscegenation – a paradigmatic form of blood mixing and
biological contamination.180
Third, the confusion of boundaries arising from blood mixing – be it incest or
miscegenation – found a counterpart in the law of inheritance and property allocation. As legal
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commentators have noted, “traditional incest statutes [were] designed to uphold a property-based
kinship system based upon marriage.”181 Leigh Beinen maintains that the traditional laws
against incest cannot be fully understood apart from the property system in which they arose.
Explaining the ideological difference between traditional and modern incest statutes, she remarks
that
[c]onsidered as a set of rules maintaining a social structure based upon marriage,
rather than as laws regarding the sexual abuse of children, including descent and
distribution and the ownership of land within the family, the incest prohibition
makes sense. In the eighteenth century, divorce was rare or nonexistent. People
who owned property stayed in one place for their entire lives. Maintaining clarity
in the ownership of land and family relationships was the primary goal. In
traditional statutes, the prohibited relationships focus upon close ties of affinity,
marriage, or consanguinity.182
In other words, traditional incest statutes represented a form of boundary maintenance with
respect to the classification and ordering of proprietary relations. In a world where “[w]ealth and
stature in the community was based upon ownership of land,” any marriage that “would confuse
the lines of inheritance and ownership of land . . . had to be prohibited.”183
In one such case involving inheritance that went before the Supreme Court of the United
States, Brewer’s Lessee v. Blougher,184 the plaintiff’s attorney envisioned a parade of horribles in
which incest and miscegenation together figured as powerful solvents that could disrupt all lines
and categories of inheritance. In that case, the Court considered the meaning of an 1852
Maryland statute that provided that “‘the illegitimate child or children of any female, and the
issue of any such child or children,’ are declared to be capable in law ‘to take and inherit both
real and personal estate from their mother, or from each other, or from the descendants of each
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other, as the case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock.’”185 In other words, under
the statute, even “illegitimate” children – including children produced through incestuous unions
– could inherit property from their mother.
Although the Court upheld the statute on the ground that “[t]he expediency and moral
tendency of this new law of inheritance, is a question for the legislature of Maryland, and not for
this Court,”186 the plaintiff’s lawyer attempted to convince it otherwise. Specifically, the
attorney argued that the act in question threatened to undermine the integrity and continuity of
the family tree:
From the careless manner of its enactment, the legislature has rendered itself
liable to be misunderstood, and its true intention frustrated. It has, indeed, if the
letter be adhered to, made a general act to direct descents for the benefit of all
illegitimate children of any female who is the propositus in the law, and who is to
be the stirps whence these relations are to branch out, from fathers and mothers
without marriage; and this too, embracing bastards issuing from adultery, and
from incest of father and dauther [sic], and even son and mother; if the depravity
of the human heart shall ever let loose such unbridled passions: and also
embracing in its confusion, bastards lineal and collateral, running into the same
incest and adultery, and bastards of colour mingled with whites, and all too in like
manner as if born in lawful wedlock. But in such a state of illegitimacy, how
could persons and families proceeding from such female, as the root, establish
their right to inherit any estate from each other?187
This notion of a world in chaos because of incest and miscegenation, as well as adultery, reveals
a world lacking cognizable boundaries, categories, and lines of descent. The metaphor of the
family tree nicely captures the extent to which incest and miscegenation posed a threat to the
coherence of domestic relations – in this case, a coherence conferred by the law of inheritance.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that in Ovid’s story of father-daughter incest, Myrrha is redeemed in
a sense through her transformation or metamorphosis into a tree: A symbol of the familial
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integrity that she not only compromised, but threatened to undermine through her incestuous
relationship with her father.
This look at the analogy between the incest taboo and the taboo against interracial
relations in legal and non-legal sources helps to bring to light how, and why, incest has
functioned as a potent symbol of boundary violation – and, by extension, of disgust. During
periods of enormous social and political change, particularly in the postwar South, intra-familial
and interracial sexual relations and marriage – collectively referred to as intermarriage –
represented not simply a biological threat, unions that ostensibly produced degraded offspring or
“deplorable results.” In addition, the unnatural mixing that these relations entailed signified
other, more symbolic or abstract forms of mixing and boundary confusion, including challenges
to state sovereignty (and related fears of interstate contamination) as well as challenges to stable
lines of inheritance. The constellation of boundary issues (and images of boundary violation)
surrounding both miscegenation and incest helps to clarify not only the extent to which incest
came to symbolize boundary violation, but also the extent to which incest was used to shore up a
normative vision of the family – one that assumed that marriage (and sexuality) was marked by
just enough (racial) similarity and just enough (familial) difference.
2.

Incest – Cloning Analogy
The incest taboo has surfaced more recently as a point of comparison to yet another

boundary violation involving the family, namely, cloning. Like incest and miscegenation,
cloning is said to represent a threat because it upsets the laws of evolutionary biology, for, like
incest, cloning involves a mode of reproduction that does not contribute to the diversification of
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the overall gene pool. While cloning might ensure the replication of the strongest genes, it might
also entail the duplication of so-called weaker traits.188
As with miscegenation and incest, however, the social and symbolic implications of
cloning outweigh the biological threat it represents. Simply put, cloning, like incest, would lead
to a confusion of names, boundaries, and roles within the family. In 1852, Henry Hughes
fulminated that “[a]malgamation is incest,” thereby collapsing the distinction between these two
crimes of blood. More recently, Leon Kass, Chairman of the President’s Bioethics Council, has
cast the repugnance of cloning in analogous terms, suggesting that cloning precipitates not only
name confusion, but the drama of incest as well:
[C]loning, if successful, would create serious issues of identity and individuality.
The clone may experience concerns about his distinctive identity not only because
he will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human being, but, in
this case, he may also be twin to the person who is his “father” or “mother” – if
one can still call them that. Unaccountably, people treat as innocent the homey
case of intrafamilial cloning—cloning of husband or wife (or single mother); they
forget about the unique dangers of mixing the twin relation with the parent-child
relation . . . . Virtually no parent is going to be able to treat a clone of himself or
herself as one does a child generated by the lottery of sex. What will happen
when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image of the woman
Daddy once fell in love with? In case of divorce, will Mommy still love the clone
of Daddy, even though she can no longer stand the sign of Daddy himself?189
It is precisely because cloning could blur the boundary separating parents from children that
Kass has opined that cloning belongs in the same category as incest: “Can anyone really give an
argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even with consent) . . . .?
The repugnance at human cloning belongs in that category.”190 Indeed, for at least one legal
commentator, cloning represents orders of magnitude beyond incest in its dangerous ability to
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violate boundaries: “If incest crosses the boundaries defining the human way of coming into
being, cloning twists and breaks them.”191
The above quotation by Kass conveys the idea that this unnatural mode of reproduction
raises the specter, and perhaps even makes possible, this “horror which is father-daughter
incest”: “What will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image of
the woman Daddy once fell in love with?” Just as the secrecy surrounding interracial sexual
relations and the children they produced increased the potential for incest, so, too, does cloning
make incest that much more possible. In this sense, cloning is not only like incest because it
precipitates identity confusion, but in fact leads to incest.
Like Kass, bioethicist James Nelson has similarly remarked that a female child who is
cloned from her mother might develop a desire for her father, and thereby threaten to usurp the
position of her mother – who is, in the end, her twin sister. Whereas Kass situates the incestuous
potential of cloning within the traditional Oedipal complex (“In case of divorce, will Mommy
still love the clone of Daddy, even though she can no longer stand the sign of Daddy himself”),
both Kass and Nelson also transform the classic Oedipal triangle into one where the daughter
threatens to destabilize the position of the mother (“What will happen when the adolescent clone
of Mommy becomes the spitting image of the woman Daddy once fell in love with?”).
The identity confusion and boundary violation that will ostensibly result from cloning is
not limited to the more conventional Oedipal situations involving parents and children. Rather,
the destructive potential of cloning branches out into the larger family tree. Kass has elsewhere
presaged a range of uncanny192 incest scenarios, remarking that
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[i]n the case of self-cloning, the offspring is, in addition, one’s twin: The dreaded
result of incest—to be parent to one’s sibling—is here brought about deliberately,
albeit without any act of coitus. Moreover, all other relationships will be
confounded: what will father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, or sister mean, and who
will bear what ties and burdens? To this it is no answer to say that our society,
with its high incidence of broken families and non-marital childbearing, already
confuses kinship and responsibility for children, unless one also wants to argue
that this, for children, is a preferable state of affairs.193
Similarly, in suggesting that “we may see in cloning the resurgence of our fascination with an
archaic form of incest with the original twin, and the grave psychotic consequences of such a
primitive fantasy (Cronenberg’s film Dead Ringers is a dramatic illustration of this),”194 Jean
Baudrillard has called attention to the possible – albeit otherwise fantastical– causal relationship
between cloning and sibling incest, a scenario that recalls Byblis’ fantasy of incest with her twin
brother, Caunus, in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.
In one sense, the cloning-incest analogy reflects the hysteria that often surrounds any
“new” technology, a panic that is particularly acute in the face of alternative reproductive
technologies. For instance, similar kinds of arguments have been made with respect to the
incestuous potential of in-vitro fertilization. In 2001, a 62-year-old French woman became one
of the world’s oldest mothers after giving birth to a baby following fertility treatment. While the
woman carried the baby to term and was therefore the gestational parent, she was not the
biological or genetic parent. Rather, the baby was conceived by her brother’s sperm and a donor

alluded to the uncanny nature of cloning when stating that “[e]ven in the absence of unusual parental expectations
for the clone—say, to live the same life, only without its errors—the child is likely to be ever a curiosity, ever a
potential source of déjà vu.” Kass, supra note_____, at 84 (emphasis added).
193
Kass, supra note _____. Kass’ cataloguing of terms here – father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, etc. – recalls the
proliferation of language that often appears in slippery slope rhetoric, as discussed in Part I, supra. In addition,
Kass’ ‘parade of horribles’ scenario once again points to the nominal basis of familial relationships – as part of the
problem with cloning is what the natural familial terms (father, grandfather, etc.) will “mean” in a post-cloning
world.
194
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE VITAL ILLUSION 12 (2000).

69

egg. Although technically not a case of incest, a French prosecutor who was investigating the
case commented that it represented an instance of “social incest.”195
In another sense, however, the incest-cloning analogy speaks to much more deep-seated
fears about the reconstitution of the family in an age where boundaries and lines of demarcation
are neither fixed nor stable. Just as the incest-miscegenation analogy – one that appeared with
greater frequency after the Civil War – reflected an anxiety over the shifting social landscape of
the postbellum South, so, too, does the incest-cloning analogy reflect an anxiety over the socalled ‘de-naturalization’ of the modern family. Considering the threat to our “cherished
classifications” and categories that cloning poses, it is no wonder that it has been linked to incest,
an exemplary form of boundary violation.

Part V

Incest as Symbol and its Legal Implications

What, then, does this analysis of the incest taboo tell us about the kind of family that the
taboo envisions, and, moreover, about what is at stake in having this particular model through
which to define the family? In addition, how does this analysis help to explain the dogged
persistence of the incest taboo as a point of comparison on the slippery slope to any nonnormative kinship arrangement? Finally, and from a more normative standpoint, what
investment does the law itself have in continuing to rely on the taboo in slippery slope arguments
pertaining to the family? Section A will draw from the previous analysis in order to summarize
how, and why, the incest taboo has been used to construct an ideal vision of the family. Section
B will then look more closely at the symbiotic relationship between the incest taboo and the law
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and will suggest that the law adopt alternative, or at least more expansive, discourses in which to
talk about kinship relations.

A.

Incest, Non-Normative Kinship Relations, and Naturalist Assumptions

What has this analysis shown us about the manner in which the incest taboo has been
used to articulate a normative vision of the family? First, and most basically, this analysis has
brought into focus the particular threat that incest signifies (or symbolizes), namely, a boundary
violation that is tied to the way in which sexual desire is expressed in the family as well as the
way in which a family reproduces itself. As I have shown, the incest taboo is a guard against the
confusion of names and roles within the family, one that results from a failure to recognize that
certain family members should not be sexual partners. I have argued that it is for this reason that
incest has been linked to other forms of boundary violation – miscegenation, cloning, and samesex relations – that similarly represent perversions of an ideal form of familial desire and
reproduction. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is telling that in some societies, adultery
and incest are grouped under the same rubric defining that which is incestuous.196 The taboo
thus reinforces not only a particular vision of the family – heterosexual parents having children
through ‘natural’ sexual means – but also the reproductive imperative behind having a family
and what it means to be a family.
The claim, advanced by some legal commentators, that “incest taboos appear less serious
than a generation ago because procreation is no longer always a primary concern of marriage,”197
thus overlooks the extent to which the taboo continues to signify a serious risk to the constitution
of the family. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason – the link between marriage and children –
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that the taboo against same-sex relations has been linked to the taboo against incest so frequently
on the slippery slope. Like incest (and now cloning), one of the reasons why same-sex marriage
is perceived as threatening to the ‘institution’ of marriage is because it would inevitably lead to a
confusion of familial roles. Anxiety over this so-called role confusion is evident in statements
such as “[c]hildren raised by homosexual couples do not have both a father and a mother. If
Heather is being raised by two mommies only, she is being deprived of the experience of being
raised by a daddy. Both the common experience of humanity and recent research suggest that a
daddy and a mommy together provide by far the best environment in which a child may be
reared.”198 Or, as the Supreme Court of Alabama remarked in 2002, “[t]he family unit does
consist, and always has consisted, of a ‘father, mother and their children, [and] immediate
kindred, constituting [the] fundamental social unit in civilized society.’”199
Judith Butler has argued that one of the reasons why same-sex relationships have been
compared to incest is because they both represent a “departure” from the symbolic norm –
namely, a deviation from the prototypical way in which sexual identity is created, and
maintained, in the family. She has observed that
the law that would secure the incest taboo as the foundation of symbolic family
structure states the universality of the incest taboo as well as its necessary
symbolic consequences. One of the symbolic consequences of the law so
formulated is precisely the derealization of lesbian and gay forms of parenting,
single-mother households, and blended family arrangements in which there may
be more than one mother or father, where the symbolic position is itself dispersed
and rearticulated in new social formations.200
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In other words, incest has become a way of describing what is troubling about those new
formations. Butler maintains thatthe incest taboo assumes or presupposes a certain kind of
family structure – mother, father, and children whose sexual desire is allocated in well-defined
ways according to biological sex – that is simply not present in alternative family arrangements.
In her estimation, it is for this reason that the “horror of incest,” and the moral revulsion it
compels in some,
is not that far afield from the same horror and revulsion felt toward lesbian and
gay sex, and is not unrelated to the intense moral condemnation of voluntary
single parenting, or gay parenting, or parenting arrangements with more than two
adults involved (practices that can be used as evidence to support a claim to
remove a child from the custody of the parent in several states in the United
States). These various modes in which the oedipal mandate fails to produce
normative family all risk entering into the metonymy of that moralized sexual
horror that is associated perhaps most fundamentally with incest.201
In other words, part of the reason why incest has persisted on the slippery slope as a point of
comparison to any non-normative kinship arrangement, is because it functions as a metaphor (or
metonymy) of sexual deviance. It is in this sense that David Schneider has observed that
“‘[i]ncest’ is symbolic of the special way in which the pattern of social relationships, as they are
normatively defined, can be broken. ‘Incest’ stands for the transgression of certain major
cultural values, the values of a particular pattern of relations among persons.”202 Just as the
slippery slope is itself a metaphor, so, too, do the objects of comparison on the slippery slope
stand in a metaphoric relationship with one another.
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It is important to note that this idea that incest signifies a threat to the way in which the
family expresses desire and/or reproduces itself is not limited to the genetic threat that incest
poses. While incest is often conceptualized as a crime of blood, the genetic argument fails to
capture the full range of boundary confusion that incest signifies. Incest is a powerful symbol of
disgust not simply because it confuses lines of genetic inheritance that should be kept separate.
Even worse, incest throws into confusion nominal differences (brother, sister) and the
relationships that those names signify. The incest taboo thus represents a social practice over
and above an innate biological response – or, in the words of the Israel court, a “natural
repugnance.” Indeed, the strength behind the historical analogy between incest and
miscegenation derives less from the fact that these are two crimes of blood – for, as I have
suggested, they represent opposite fears – and more from the fact that they signified confusion
over one’s social and proprietary inheritance.
Second, this analysis of incest as boundary violation shows that the incest taboo has
created an additional space in which to talk about sexual deviance. The cloning-incest analogy
provides a good example of the way in which comparisons between non-normative family
arrangements and incest (on the slippery slope) provide an opportunity to talk in negative ways
about any unconventional relationship and to reinforce the norm. For instance, Laurence Tribe
and others have suggested that the debate over cloning has provided a platform for critics to
inveigh against any non-normative relationship.203 Tribe has remarked that “the arguments
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supporting an ironclad prohibition of cloning are most likely to rest on, and reinforce, the notion
that it is unnatural and intrinsically wrong to sever the conventional links between heterosexual
unions sanctified by tradition and the creation and upbringing of new life.”204 Similarly,
Professors Eskridge and Stein have pointed out that “antigay sentiments probably contribute to
anticloning sentiments . . . some of the same impulses that form intense homophobic reactions
would generate reactions to the possibility of cloning.”205 Kass’ cloning-incest analogy
represents a good case in point, for the analogy has allowed Kass not only to articulate what is
disturbing about cloning,but also to express his views on same -sex parenting and singleparenting as well. Although Kass insists that his repugnance for cloning derives from a prerational intuition (or wisdom) to which we should give heed, he nevertheless grounds his
arguments against cloning within the larger social context of the family, and, more specifically,
non-traditional families.
For instance, it is not repugnance at cloning per se that drives most of Kass’ arguments,
but rather revulsion at the kinds of non-traditional families and “unnatural” modes of
reproduction that cloning not only signifies, but, even worse, facilitates and encourages. In his
estimation, cloning represents the absurd extension of the “sexual revolution” that has
undermined the naturally-conceived, two-parent, heterosexual family. He says:

if one could enforce a ban on cloning, or at least insure that clones would not be a marginalized caste, the social
costs of prohibition could still be high. For the arguments supporting an ironclad prohibition of cloningare most
likely to rest on, and reinforce, the notion that it is unnatural and intrinsically wrong to sever the conventional links
between heterosexual unions sanctified by tradition and the creation and upbringing of new life”); (“The
entrenchment of that notion cannot be a welcome thing for lesbians, gay men and perhaps others with
unconventional ways of linking erotic attachment, romantic commitment, genetic replication, gestational mothering
and the joys and responsibilities of child rearing”).
204
Id.
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Cloning turns out to be the perfect embodiment of the ruling opinions of our new
age. Thanks to the sexual revolution, we are able to deny in practice, and
increasingly in thought, the inherent procreative teleology of sexuality itself. But,
if sex has no intrinsic connection to generating babies, babies need have no
necessary connection to sex. Thanks to feminism and the gay rights movement,
we are increasingly encouraged to treat the natural heterosexual difference and its
preeminence as a matter of “cultural construction.” But if male and female are
not normatively complementary and generatively significant, babies need not
come from male and female complementarity. Thanks to the prominence and the
acceptability of divorce and out-of-wedlock births, stable, monogamous marriage
as the ideal home for procreation is no longer the agreed-upon cultural norm. For
that new dispensation, the clone is the ideal emblem: the ultimate “single-parent
child.”206
James Wilson has similarly argued that “[t]he major threat cloning produces is a further
weakening of the two-parent family,”207 and, worse yet, the “possibility that a lesbian couple will
use cloning to produce a child.”208 Wilson in fact questions whether “we wish to make it easy
for a homosexual pair to have children?”209 Even Baudrillard has tacitly expressed disdain for
the likelihood that cloning and lesbian parenting will go hand-in-hand:
This matter of the clones, in fact, could call a number of things into question—
and that is the irony of the situation. The clone, after all, could also appear as a
grotesque parody of the original. It is not hard to imagine a whole range of
potential problems and new conflicts issuing from cloning that would turn oedipal
psychology upside down. Consider, for instance, a clone of the future
overthrowing his father, not in order to sleep with his mother – which would be
impossible, anyway, since she is nothing but a matrix of cells, and besides, the
“father” could very well be a woman – but in order to secure his status as the
Original.210
Lesbian and single mothers figure prominently in these ‘parade of horrible’ scenarios – explicit
in Kass and Wilson, implicit in Baudrillard – and appear to bear the largest brunt of the debate
surrounding cloning. In this sense, antigay rhetoric and anti-cloning rhetoric are mutually
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constitutive and reinforcing – the former leading to, and doubling back on, the latter, and vice
versa.
By placing incest in the same category as cloning, and cloning in the same category as
same-sex and single parenting, critics have thus managed to use the cloning debate as a platform
from which to denounce any kind of non-traditional family marked by ‘Oedipal confusion.’ It is
in precisely this sense that the taboo against incest has been “mobilized to establish certain forms
of kinship as the only intelligible and livable ones,”211 and that the discussion surrounding
cloning has cast all non-traditional forms of desire and reproduction as “some version of original
sin.”212 As Tribe reminds us, any prohibition, be it the taboo against incest or the related taboo
against cloning, carries with it enormous residual social costs – particularly when that prohibition
applies to a method of human creation or bears on the constitution of the family.213
Third, this analysis of incest as boundary violation has demonstrated the extent to which
nature, or the notion of what is ‘natural,’ continues to shape the ideal conception of kinship in the
context of family law. That is, same-sex relations and cloning are often grouped together with
incest in slippery slope arguments because all three represent a perversion of what is considered
to be a natural form of the family and a natural form of sexual reproduction. Hadley Arkes
expressed these sentiments when testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on behalf of
DOMA, stating that“one thing can be attributed to the gay activists quite fairly and accurately:

211

BUTLER, supra note _____, at 70.
Tribe, supra note _____, at 229.
213
Id. at 230. Responding to the essentialist arguments and the appeals to nature that are part and parcel of the
cloning debate, Tribe states that
212

the entrenchment of that essentialist notion, its deeper embedding in our culture and our law, is in
turn anything but costless. It is most assuredly not costless for lesbians, gay men, persons gay or
straight with genetically transmittable diseases, and others whose sexual or other orientations or
capacities draw them into unconventional patterns of intimate relationship—and unconventional
modes of linking erotic attachment, romantic commitment, genetic replication, gestational
mothering, and the joys and responsibilities of parenting. Id.

77

and that is that they do have the most profound interest, rooted in the logic of their doctrine, in
discrediting the notion that marriage finds its defining ground in ‘nature.’”214 A number of other
critics of same-sex marriage, as well as cloning, have similarly adverted to the paradigm of
nature to support their position against these alternative kinship arrangements.
That nature has continued to remain an organizing principle of kinship relations in the
family law context is a large part of the reason why the law in many states does not permit samesex adoption as well as the reason why the incest taboo itself does not apply in some states to
step- and adoptive families. While many are disgusted when confronted with sibling incest
between non-related individuals – recall, for instance, the respondents in Haidt’s study or the
public reaction to the Woody Allen scandal – the law (in many states) continues to rely on the
paradigm of nature to determine whether sexual relationships between certain family members
are a source of disgust (the Israel court’s “natural repugnance”) and therefore constitute a form
of incest that warrants legal prohibition. The impulse that leads to comparisons between incest
and same-sex relationships – because each is unnatural – is part of the same impulse that has led
to the uneven application of the incest taboo in families with an ‘artificial’ basis, for it is only in
those states where adoptive and step-relatives are fully naturalized into the family that the incest
taboo applies. In either case, the law relies on the incest taboo to define the contours of the
natural family unit. While it would appear that our understanding of what is natural has changed
and shifted over time, the incest taboo has remained a relatively constant symbol of the
‘unnatural’ in legal discourse. In other words, even as the taboo has expanded to cover other
familial arrangements – such as stepfamilies and adoptive families – it continues to rely on the
paradigm of nature to determine what deserves legal recognition.
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Fourth and last, this analysis has revealed the discomfort that society experiences with
relationships based on too much similarity or too much difference, as well as the degree to which
notions of similarity and difference are deeply entrenched in law and culture. Related to its
symbolic importance as an exemplary form of boundary violation, incest represents an unnatural
mixing of the same and for this reason has functioned as a point of comparison to other so-called
unnatural forms of sameness, same-sex relations and cloning. While the incest-miscegenation
analogy would appear to represent a variation on this theme, anthropologists have suggested that
forms of excessive similarity (incest) and excessive difference (miscegenation) are equally
forbidden and thus constitute analogous, companion taboos. For instance, Héritier has found that
the incest taboo works in an expansive way to forbid the mixing of the too identical as well as
the mixing of the too different. She maintains that “if combination of the identical is thought to
produce harmful results, it will be prohibited, and the juxtaposition or combination of different
elements will be sought. Inversely, if combination of the identical is thought to produce good
effects, it will be sought out and the combining of different things will be avoided.”215 Others
have similarly observed that in some cultures, animals cannot be eaten if they are too close to
humans or too distant from humans, and that sexual partners cannot be too much like the self
(same sex, same nuclear family) or too distant (animals, people of other races).216
The fact that the incest taboo has been used to construct identities based on similarity and
difference taps into a key feature of human thought and representation, namely, the notion of
similarity and difference that lies “at the origin of our most profound mental categories.”217
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Héritier’s analysis is once again instructive. She notes that “a grammar is founded on the
opposition between the identical and the different, on the classification of objects in one or the
other category, and on the movements that affect these objects because of their attributed
character in a classificatory category.”218 It is in this sense that the incest taboo, which generates
a range of social organizations and social categories, is both symbolic and constitutive of human
thought itself. Thus, we have come full circle. If the incest taboo is the language or “grammar”
that ensures the replication of the categories that society uses to structure acceptable and
unacceptable forms of sameness and difference, then incest is symbolic of those ungrammatical
human relations – intrafamilial sexuality, same-sex relations, miscegenation, cloning – that give
rise to our collective disgust.

B.

Law and the Persistence of the Incest Taboo

Is the taboo an ineradicable part of the law? One way to answer this question is to return
to the theory of disgust discussed in Part IV. There, I suggested that a characteristic feature of
disgust is the act of drawing a boundary between us and them, or what Miller has called the line
separating “purity from pollution.” This same theory of disgust suggests that what exists inside
the boundaries – the norm – critically depends on what lies outside the boundaries – the nonnormative – to define itself. For this reason, it could be that the law turns to what exists outside
the boundaries – here, incest or the incest taboo – as the extreme case by which to define
normative kinship relations. This theory of disgust provides at least two reasons why a
symbiotic relationships exists between law and the incest taboo and why law and culture need
the taboo as a point of reference.
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Certain objects of disgust, like incest, can provide a convenient focal point for inciting
public opinion around certain morally charged issues. Douglas explains that “when moral
principles come into conflict, a pollution rule can reduce confusion by giving a simple focus for
concern,” and that “when action that is held to be morally wrong does not provoke moral
indignation, belief in the harmful consequences of a pollution can have the effect of aggravating
the seriousness of the offense, and so of marshalling public opinion on the side of the right.”219
Applying Douglas’ analysis to the taboo under consideration, we might say that the incest taboo
has been deployed in part to magnify the seriousness of certain acts, such as same-sex sodomy
and/or marriage, that have not universally provoked moral indignation. As discussed above, one
of the reasons why incest has been such a durable and effective player on the slippery slope is
because everyone is repulsed by it, regardless of political affiliation. Those who are undecided
over the issue of same-sex marriage might be easily swayed by the invocation to incest.
In addition, at the same time that disgust helps to maintain physical, social, and moral
boundaries, it also relies on what lies outside those boundaries as a means of defining and
sustaining that which lies within. For instance, in offering a structural explanation for the
pollution taboos catalogued in Leviticus, Douglas states that “a rule of avoiding anomalous
things affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not conform. So where Leviticus
abhors crawling things, we should see the abomination as the negative side of the pattern of
things approved.”220 In other words, objects of disgust – consensual incest, same-sex relations,
cloning – reflect and thereby reinforce the norm from which they depart. It is in this sense that
the incest taboo, and anything that becomes indelibly associated with it, work to reify the
existing social order and familial structure. As Miller observes, “[l]ike those we hate, those who
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disgust us define who we are and whom we are connected with. We need them too –
downwind.”221
Similarly, we might approach the incest taboo as a convenient symbol in structuring what
Jonathan Dollimore has referred to as the system of “binary oppositions” that lie at the root of
Western thought. Dollimore has argued that “similarity” between what lies within (the “inlaw”)
and what lies without (the “outlaw”) creates an anxiety whereby “the outlaw . . . as inlaw, and
the other as proximate [prove] more disturbing than the other as absolute difference.” At the
same time, he points to the fact that the most effective way to maintain this system of polar
opposition is to figure its collapse – that is, to depict the outlaw as proximate and similar to the
inlaw.222 In the same vein, Butler has suggested that the incest prohibition needs “to sustain and
manage a specter of its non-working in order to proceed,” that is, that the incest prohibition is
effective only when it produces “the specter of its transgression.”223 It would thus appear that
the incest taboo is an indispensable part of all slippery slope arguments presaging the collapse of
sexual prohibitions and a world of sexual abandon, as the taboo maintains its power and efficacy
by remaining a constant threat.
Given the need to structure relationships according to a system of binary oppositions and
the manner in which the incest taboo satisfies this need, the question remains as to whether the
incest taboo is a permanent feature of the law. As I have suggested, disgust and the taboos in
which it finds expression are constitutive features of the law, which relieson metaphors of lines,
grids, slopes, and other varieties of boundary maintenance and boundary control. In this sense,
one might argue that positive or enacted law merely reflects and re-enacts the rituals of taboo and
disgust that have shaped and informed societies from time immemorial. Adding to this difficulty
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is the increasingly more recognized assumption that moral judgment derives from intuitive
disgust reflexes rather than from a more calculated process of ratiocination and moral reasoning.
When viewed in this light, it would seem that the eradication of disgust from human decisionmaking is unlikely if not futile – for to require individuals to become cognizant of their
prejudices and biases is no small task.
One way to challenge the extent to which ‘incest-revulsion’ has substituted for rational
evaluation of the incest taboo (and anything to which incest has been compared) is to recognize
the taboo’s (or, for that matter, any taboo’s) distinctly historical and social character.
Specifically, it is important to recognize the way in which the incest taboo has surfaced and
resurfaced over time in particular social contexts as one of the many vehicles through which the
state has controlled sexuality and the constitution of the family. Professor Beinen has remarked
that “[t]he multiplicity of laws governing incestuous behavior” and the fact that the meaning of
incest has varied “markedly” over time, reveal the extent to which the legal definition of incest
often reduces to an “ideological” or “philosophical” question.224 At least one court – the
Supreme Court of Georgia in Benton v. State – has recognized the cultural origin of the incest
taboo when stating that “[b]eing primarily cultural in origin, the taboo is neither instinctual nor
biological, and it has very little to do with actual blood ties.” By placing the taboo squarely
within a cultural context, the Benton court was able to turn away from binary oppositions and the
paradigm of “nature” to find that “Georgia’s decision to include step-parents in its statutory
proscription against incest is neither unreasonable nor out of keeping with the historical purpose
and meaning of the taboo.”225 When considered in this broader socio-historical context, the
incest taboo would become less monolithic and comparisons between incest and other non-
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normative kinship structures less frequent. Indeed, as some scholars have argued, it is no longer
possible to think about those “core symbols” of American kinship, like the incest taboo, in the
“abstracted framework in which they were first conceived or to neglect the ways in which
Americans understand them as ‘naturally’ gendered configurations.”226
In addition, it is necessary for the law to turn to other models or archetypes of the family
rather than to rely exclusively on the Oedipal mandate and the model of the family that it
presupposes. Other disciplines, most notably anthropology, have more recently deemphasized
the role that the incest taboo has played in structuring kinship relations across a range of cultures.
What is now referred to as the “new kinship studies” relies less on the symbolic importance of
the incest taboo and more on the “diffuse” forms of “relatedness” that do not adhere to the
essentialist or naturalist paradigm that the incest taboo perpetuates.227 These studies have
demonstrated the extent to which the taboo has been used to structure kinship relations according
to this paradigm, and, in the process, to denigrate alternative kinship arrangements (same-sex
parenting) and to preserve gender hierarchy. Reacting to the traditional, structuralist accounts of
the taboo, Susan McKinnon, echoing Gayle Rubin, has remarked that“[t]he incest taboo . . . [has
been] framed as the paternal and fraternal rights to regulate the market of scarce products [i.e.,
women] to ensure the equal distribution and consumption of women.”228 In other words, the
incest taboo, at least as it has been theoretically conceived, supports a gender hierarchy whereby
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women are “traded out” of families in order to satisfy the exogamic imperative of marrying
outside one’s immediate clan or tribe.
In releasing the incest taboo from its archetypal moorings, these studies have adopted
alternative kinship models that supersede the staid conception of the family that currently obtains
in American law. Indeed, it is necessary for the law also to adopt – or simply to understand –
those models of kinship that do not necessarily conform to the Oedipal prototype. In the United
States, kinship relations continue to be determined and structured along blood lines. It is perhaps
for this reason that the incest taboo has continued to provide the language – or grammar – in
which we articulate and ‘speak about’ the family. Insofar as the incest taboo is an integral part
of thought and language, it is necessary for the law, dependent as it is on language, to be one of
the primary vehicles through which to challenge the structuralist assumptions that underlie what
it means to be a family.

Part VI

CONCLUSION

This Article has offered a theory that explains why the incest taboo has been a persistent
player on the slippery slope of sexual deviance, even though incest is, for the reasons detailed
above, a bad fit for slippery slope arguments. Although it has not offered reasons why incest
laws should be repealed, it has suggested that legal actors and policymakers look more closely at
the connections they make between incest and other sexual relationships – most notably, samesex relations – and that the law reappraise the extent to which disgust motivates legal and
political decision-making.
The boundary violation theory that I have put forth serves both a descriptive and a
prescriptive function. The descriptive claim that incest, as a mechanism of disgust, represents a
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prototypical or archetypal form of boundary violation, helps to clarify what has been for political
conservatives and liberals alike a strange conflation of otherwise distinct social, sexual, and
reproductive practices – be it incest and same-sex relations or incest and cloning. For instance,
groups from both ends of the political spectrum have commented on the unfortunate comparison
between incestuous and same-sex relations – some conservatives remarkingthat it does not help
their cause and many liberals remarking that it hurts theirs.229 And yet, the social science
literature suggests thatincest is perhaps the one taboo that unites both political groups, insofar as
everyone is equally repulsed by it. Incest thus has an enormous power to disgust, and thereby to
unite otherwise divergent camps.
The prescriptive suggestion that the law turn away from the taboo – as a means of
structuring and organizing sexuality and kinship relations – is in some ways in tension with the
descriptive claims that I have made here. That is, given the extent to which incest inspires
disgust, and given the trenchancy of the incest taboo, how is the law to adopt alternative models
of sexuality and kinship that do not denigrate a range of relationships in the process? I suggest
that while descriptive claims and prescriptive suggestions often conflict in the law, this fact alone
should not deter legal actors from turning to more empirically-based and rational accounts of
sexuality and the family. I would submit that at least one court, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Benton v. State, has already made this attempt by focusing less on the taboo as an instinctive and
universal given and more on anthropological accounts that have highlighted its sociallyconstructed character. It would be wise for a range of legal actors and policymakers to follow its
lead.
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